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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Folk Epistemology of Factual, Political, and Religious Beliefs 
by 
John Christner 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychological & Brain Sciences 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2017 
Professor Leonard Green, Chair 
 The term “folk” refers to the intuitive – as opposed to the academic – version of a 
discipline (e.g., folk physics).  The present series of seven studies explored folk epistemology, 
that is, how laypeople intuitively think about their own knowledge.  Concepts from academic 
epistemology were investigated in laypeople.  In addition, folk epistemology across three 
domains of knowledge were compared: religious, political, and factual.   
 Studies consisted of two parts.  In Part 1, participants were presented with religious, 
political, and factual statements and asked how certain they were that each statement was true.  
In Part 2, participants were re-presented with only statements that they had rated as very 
certainly true in Part 1.  For each statement presented in Part 2, participants were asked to reflect 
on epistemological concepts related to how/why they believed the statement to be true.  Studies 1 
and 2 helped to validate the research materials.  Studies 3 and 4 investigated the extent to which 
laypeople use and value verification and falsification, respectively, across the three domains.  
Study 5 examined theories of truth – do laypeople define the truth of religious, political, and 
factual beliefs based on correspondence, coherence, or pragmatism?  Study 6 explored 
objectivity – do laypeople feel their beliefs are objectively true?  Study 7 explored several 
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concepts related to overall certainty and nature of belief, including the required effort to believe, 
frequency of doubt, and obviousness and reasonableness of truth. Participants also were asked 
how they would react to those who disagreed with them and to counterarguments as another 
window into the nature of their beliefs.  
 Results showed that (i) folk epistemology differed systematically across the three 
domains; (ii) intuitions about factual knowledge were more closely related to normative, 
academic standards; and (iii) intuitions about religious and political knowledge were strikingly 
different from normative standards. That is to say, religious and political beliefs were regarded as 
less verifiable, less falsifiable, less consistent with other true propositions, more dubious, less 
reasonable, and more subjective.   
 These results suggest that current conceptions of why/how people believe propositions to 
be “true” insufficiently describe belief in the political and religious domains.  Truth 
determination is neither domain-general, nor does it rely exclusively on propositional content.  
Laypeople appear to be less certain that religious and political propositions accurately track 
reality.  Exactly which factors motivate belief in these domains is still not fully understood.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 How do people think about the nature of truth, knowledge, and belief? For centuries, 
questions about the acquisition and definition of knowledge were of concern only to 
philosophers (Dancy, 1985). Epistemology (the academic discipline) explores many aspects of 
human knowledge – how we justify our beliefs, define truth, and acquire knowledge (Honderich, 
2005). It is the task of philosophers to establish normative standards and principles with which to 
conceptualize knowledge. Recently, however, behavioral scientists have approached the 
investigation of knowledge in another way, focusing not on the normative project of academic 
epistemology, but rather on describing “folk epistemology” – intuitive theories and principles 
that laypeople actually use when thinking about their own knowledge. This area of research may 
be referred to as personal epistemology, folk epistemology, or simply epistemics (“folk 
epistemology” will be used henceforth). 
 Folk epistemology is of interest to psychologists because it relates to many aspects of 
human life – how we make decisions, form beliefs, learn, and commit to various propositions. 
Major questions in the field revolve around how laypeople evaluate different sources of 
knowledge. For example, are some people to be more believed than others, and why (Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997)? Is knowledge considered absolute or relative (Goodwin & Darley, 2008)? That 
is, can different people’s perspectives be both true and contradictory at the same time? Other 
questions pertain to the issue of how people justify their knowledge. For example, is the 
subjective feeling of “certainty” the result of analytic reasoning, or is the feeling of certainty 
generated by relatively heuristic processes (Buehl, Alexander, & Murphy, 2002)? Important 
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questions arise, too, over developmental issues. For example, at what age do children’s attitudes 
about truth and certainty change (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000)? Finally, differences in 
folk epistemology may depend on the particular domain of knowledge being considered. For 
example, do people have a subjective sense that the facts learned about math and science are 
more “objectively true” than is the case for social studies (Hofer, 2000)? Answering questions 
like these helps us to understand how children learn, why conflicts over certain propositions 
persist while others easily resolve, the nuances of the intuitive definition of “true,” and much 
more.  
1.1 Goals of the Current Research 
 The purposes of the present series of studies are twofold: firstly, to investigate theories 
and principles from academic epistemology in laypeople. To what extent do laypeople rely on 
the same ideas that philosophers use when they think intuitively about their own knowledge? In 
order to answer this question, I present participants with straightforward, factual propositions – 
that is, statements that refer to observable states of the world – and ask them to reflect on how 
and why they believe these propositions to be true. More specifically, I ask if they rely on 
various ideas from epistemology that have not yet been explored in laypeople (e.g., verification, 
falsification, theories of truth, etc.).  
 The second purpose is to investigate hypothesized folk epistemological differences in two 
previously underexplored domains of knowledge, specifically, the religious and the political. In 
order to create a comparison to straightforward factual knowledge, I also ask people about 
religious and political propositions that they believe to be true. As will be discussed in greater 
detail below, the folk epistemology of religious and political propositions is fascinating for three 
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reasons: (i) previous research on intuitions about knowledge in these domains is sparse; (ii) many 
propositions in these domains violate principles from normative epistemology; and (iii) belief in 
these domains is accompanied by social costs and benefits, thereby creating a unique 
motivational landscape with respect to belief.  
 In sum, the current research examines normative epistemological concepts as well as 
other interesting ideas related to intuitions about knowledge in laypeople. Many of these 
concepts have not yet been investigated. In order to explore “default,” or most common folk 
epistemology, participants are asked about factual beliefs. In addition, the current research 
simultaneously searches for domain specific, folk epistemological differences by asking 
participants about religious and political beliefs. 
1.2 Philosophical Background and History of Folk Epistemology 
 Before considering the rationale and design of the present studies in more detail, it is 
important to provide a brief overview of the relevant philosophical terminology and a tour of 
previous research in folk epistemology. These discussions provide a better understanding of 
concepts that will be examined in the present studies and popular methodological approaches and 
topics of interest in the field. 
1.2.1 Epistemological Theories and Principles 
 The present set of studies asks laypeople about principles/theories from philosophy. 
These ideas relate primarily to justification (the process of determining what is true) and truth 
(the nature, or defining characteristics of being true). What follows is a brief review of those 
concepts from philosophy that are relevant to the current research.  
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Justification 
 Which ideas from academic epistemology do laypeople intuitively use, if any, when 
justifying their beliefs? Is intuitive justification different for “fact-based” beliefs compared to 
religious beliefs? In philosophy, the major theory of justification is evidentialism, which, simply 
put, states that justification of a conclusion depends on the evidence for it. In cases where 
evidence does not exist, then the conclusion or belief is deemed unjustified, untrue, and cannot 
be “known.” As Hume put it, “A wise man. . . proportions his belief to the evidence” (Hume & 
Beauchamp, 2000, p. 56). Evidentialism has been supported by many influential philosophers 
and remains the dominant theory of justification today. 
 An opposing theory of justification is fideism. Fideism is “exclusive or basic reliance 
upon faith alone, accompanied by a consequent disparagement of reason and utilized especially 
in the pursuit of philosophical or religious truth” (Plantinga, 1983, p. 87). Fideism is invoked 
primarily in the philosophy of religion. Ideas supporting fideism date back as far as earliest 
thinkers in the Catholic church, but the term was not coined until the 19th century (Amesbury, 
2016). 
 Evidentialism is the sole theory of justification in modern science and is considered 
normative in epistemology. Two influential ideas born out of philosophy that remain standard in 
the scientific approach to achieving justification through evidence are verification and 
falsification. Grounded in the empiricist tradition, the logical positivist movement of the 1920s 
originally argued that for a statement to be even cognitively meaningful (and therefore true or 
knowable), it must be verifiable (Ayer, 2012). Later, Karl Popper argued that falsification was 
more useful for testing hypotheses about truth. According to Popper, the strongest hypothesis 
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must posit some observable state of the world that could prove it to be false, thereby enabling it 
to be tested. If researchers attempt but fail to falsify a hypothesis, then it is believed to be more 
true (Popper, 2005). 
Theories of Truth 
 When considering their own beliefs, do laypeople define truth like philosophers do? Does 
the intuitive definition of truth change across domains of knowledge (religious, factual, 
political)? Whereas justification describes a process for arriving at truth, truth itself is a 
description of the nature of a proposition. Three major theories of truth, in order of popularity, 
are the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories (Kirkham, 1992).  
 Correspondence. Correspondence theory states that a proposition is true to the extent that 
it corresponds to a state of the world. Any reliance on reality as a source for substantiating facts 
could be said to fall under correspondence theory. This approach to defining truth dates back to 
Aristotle, but influential thinkers like Bertrand Russell have supported and discussed the theory 
more formally (Russell & Eames, 1984). An example of correspondence would be the statement, 
“Koalas are in Australia.” The statement is true because the state of the world is such that koalas 
are in Australia. The state of the world is not true or false itself, rather, it simply is. If the 
proposition corresponds to that state of the world, then the proposition is true. Correspondence 
theory works well for propositions that are linked to observable or at least theoretically 
detectable states of the world. Critics complain that the theory is circular or vacuous because in 
order to determine if a statement corresponds to a state of the world accurately, the state of the 
world would need be determined in the first place. Thus, there would need to be some 
ontological theory already in place that would accomplish any function purportedly derived from 
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correspondence theory (Williams, 1999). Despite these criticisms, correspondence theory 
remains dominant among philosophers for defining the nature of truth.  
 Coherence. The most influential competing theory of truth to correspondence is 
coherence theory. Coherence theory states that propositions are true to the extent that they cohere 
with other established propositions, forming a mutually corroborating system of beliefs like a 
web. This theory is often attributed to the scholars in the idealism school of thought which 
construes reality as mentally constructed rather than existing independent of the mind (Walker, 
1989). Because of this metaphysical position, idealists like Kant found coherence more 
compelling than correspondence, which refers to an external reality. Coherence theory often 
provides support for truth alongside correspondence because beliefs that cohere with one another 
may fit together as part of a theory that ultimately rests on correspondence with the world (e.g., 
physical evidence that fits together to convict a murder suspect). But coherence theory is 
uniquely well-suited to explain instances of truth in which correspondence can be unclear, such 
as in the case of mathematical proofs.  
 Pragmatic. The pragmatic theory of truth, often attributed to William James, rejects the 
idea that truth depends on principles like correspondence or coherence. Instead, truth arises from 
how well a proposition functions for some purpose relative to its alternatives (Kirkham, 1992). 
The pragmatic theory is sometimes used to understand the provisional truth of scientific claims 
that function to explain phenomena and are always vulnerable to substitution for a better-
functioning explanation. The present research explores the possibility that among laypeople, the 
pragmatic theory may be used for ethical or religious truths that lack both correspondence and 
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coherence, but are believed to function well for the good of society (e.g., “The world would be a 
better place if everyone believed in God”). 
Summary of Epistemological Concepts 
 Evidentialism is the prominent theory of justification whereby a proposition is considered 
justified insofar as there is evidence for it. Under evidentialism, verification and falsification 
remain popular tools for navigating evidence to confirm or disconfirm hypotheses. Fideism is the 
idea that truth can be directly known through faith and does not require justification. It is often 
used in religious contexts.  
 Three theories of truth prominent among philosophers are relevant to the present series of 
studies. Correspondence refers to a relationship between a statement and the world. According to 
correspondence theory, a statement is true when it accurately describes a state of the world. 
Coherence refers to the relationship between true statements. According to coherence theory, a 
statement is true when it is consistent with other true statements. Pragmatic refers to the 
functionality of a statement for a given purpose. According to pragmatic theory, a statement is 
true when its consequences are most useful for accomplishing a goal.   
1.2.2 Psychological Research on Folk Epistemology 
 Although the present research does not involve children or developmental issues, much 
of the previous research in folk epistemology has been conducted by developmental 
psychologists. In addition, developmental psychologists generated many of the early questions 
and theories that organized the field of folk epistemology. What follows is a brief review of the 
historical roots and foundational contributions that remain relevant today. This review is meant 
to familiarize the reader with the field of folk epistemology, popular methods, and types of 
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questions scholars have pursued previously – all of which are relevant to the present set of 
studies.  
 Jean Piaget was one of the earliest scientists to study folk epistemology. His theory, 
called “genetic epistemology,” set out to understand the origins and development of human 
knowledge. According to Piaget, humans pass through four developmental stages: sensorimotor 
(0-2 years old), preoperational (3-7 years old), concrete operations (8-11 years old), and formal 
operations (12 and beyond). Each stage signifies a progression in intelligence and reasoning 
abilities from mere motor skills to complex thought about abstract concepts and deductive 
reasoning (Piaget, 1950).  
 Piaget’s approach motivated developmental psychologists to become pioneers in the 
study of folk epistemology. Many followed his view by theorizing about the development of 
epistemological features as a progression of stages. Kohlberg’s classic studies on the 
development of morality investigated how children justify their knowledge and reason about 
moral judgments throughout six stages (Kohlberg, 1971, 1976, 1981). Perry (1970) posited 
stages of epistemological growth, focusing on adolescence into college years, in which young 
people shifted from an absolutist to a more relativist understanding of truth.  
 Over the years, much of the developmental psychological theorizing and research fell 
under the umbrella term “personal epistemology” (for reviews of various theories of personal 
epistemology, see Hofer, 2001; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). As personal epistemology evolved as a 
field, scholars sought to standardize terminology and unify related ideas about developmental 
stages into a common framework. Kuhn et al. (2000) offered a unification of existing stage 
8 
 
 
 
 
theories and investigated the source of knowledge, the subjectivity of knowledge, and how 
intuitions vary across domains.  
 Kuhn et al. (2000) asked 5th, 8th, and 12th graders, and adults to evaluate disagreements 
between “Robin” and “Chris” by reading statements about what Robin versus Chris believed. For 
example, Robin believed one mathematician's proof of a math formula whereas Chris believed a 
second mathematician's proof of the same math formula. Participants evaluated disagreements in 
several different domains of knowledge including social facts, physical facts, personal tastes, and 
social conventions. After being told about each disagreement, participants were asked if only one 
person could be right or if both people could be at least partially correct. If the participant 
responded that both people could be right, then a follow-up question was asked: “Can one view 
be more right?”  
 Kuhn et al. (2000) interpreted an answer that only one view could be right as “absolutist” 
whereas a response that both views could have some rightness was labeled “multiplist.” If the 
participant thought one view could have more merit, they then were labeled “evaluativist” (see 
Table 1, which displays a summary of Kuhn’s theory). Although there was a large variety in the 
patterns of responses, Kuhn et al. interpreted the results as showing a progression through the 
stages from absolutist to multiplist to evaluativist. This pattern was consistent across different 
domains of knowledge like tastes, facts, and social conventions.  
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Table 1 
Developmental stages of epistemological understanding (cf. Kuhn et al. 2000) 
Stage Assertions    Reality Knowledge Critical thinking 
Realist Assertions are COPIES of 
an external reality. 
Reality is 
directly 
knowable. 
Knowledge comes 
from an external 
source and is certain. 
Critical thinking is 
unnecessary. 
Absolutist Assertions are FACTS 
that are correct or incorrect 
in their representation of 
reality (possibility of false 
belief). 
Reality is 
directly 
knowable. 
Knowledge comes 
from an external 
source and is certain. 
Critical thinking is a vehicle 
for comparing assertions to 
reality and determining their 
truth or falsehood. 
Multiplist Assertions are OPINIONS 
freely  
chosen     by and 
accountable only to their 
owners. 
Reality is not 
directly 
knowable. 
Knowledge is 
generated by human 
minds and is 
uncertain. 
Critical thinking is 
irrelevant. 
Evaluativist   Assertions are 
JUDGMENTS that can be 
evaluated and compared 
according to criteria of 
argument and evidence. 
Reality is not 
directly 
knowable. 
Knowledge is 
generated by human 
minds and is 
uncertain. 
Critical thinking is valued as 
a vehicle that promotes sound 
assertions and enhances 
understanding. 
 
Summary of Developmental Psychological Contributions 
 The research questions, methods, and Kuhn et al.’s (2000) stage theory all exemplify the 
foundational contributions to folk epistemology research from developmental psychologists and 
personal epistemology. The source of knowledge, certainty, structure, objectivity, and domain 
generality versus specificity all became topics of continued exploration. Asking people to 
evaluate assertions, beliefs, and disagreements became frequently used methods of accessing 
intuitions about knowledge. The present research borrows from several of these contributions, 
but focuses on previously understudied domains of knowledge in adult participants.  
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The Domain Specificity/Generality Debate 
 One question first raised by developmental psychologists that remains relevant today is 
whether folk epistemology is domain specific or general – that is, are laypeople’s intuitions 
about knowledge different depending on the domain of knowledge? Early on, many scholars 
interested primarily in human development focused on stages and patterns of folk 
epistemological changes that occurred reliably over the lifespan at certain ages. These thinkers 
parsed differences in folk epistemology according to stage rather than domain. However, 
evidence for domain specificity has accumulated.   
 Hofer (2000) administered questionnaires to first-year undergraduate psychology 
students. Participants were asked to respond on a scale from 1-5, indicating the extent to which 
they agreed with statements designed to investigate four aspects of folk epistemology: certainty 
of knowledge, simplicity of knowledge, source of knowledge, and justification for knowing. For 
example, statements included, ‘‘In this field, today’s facts may be tomorrow’s fiction;” “In this 
field, the only thing uncertain is uncertainty itself;” and “In this field, most words have one clear 
meaning’’(Hofer, 2000, p. 388). One questionnaire was labeled “Psychology” at the top while 
another was labeled “Science” (which referred to “hard sciences”). Results showed four major 
differences between folk epistemology in psychology versus science. Participants responded that 
scientific knowledge was more certain, attainable, and derived from authority than psychological 
knowledge. However, personal experience was said to be a greater source of justification in 
psychology. Hofer concluded that discipline-focused epistemological beliefs existed.  
 Buehl et al. (2002) also used questionnaires administered to undergraduates, and 
compared students’ folk epistemology with respect to history versus math. Students were asked 
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to rate the extent to which they agreed with statements like, “Ideas in math/history are related to 
each other,” or ‘‘History/math is unrelated to day-to-day life.’’ Buehl et al. found that students 
viewed mathematical knowledge as more difficult to attain and more integrated with other 
knowledge.  
 Wainryb, Shaw, Langley, Cottam, and Lewis (2004) used imaginary disagreements as a 
way to elicit children’s (ages 5, 7, and 9) beliefs about subjectivity and justification of 
knowledge and tolerance of opposing viewpoints. Four domains were studied: Morality (‘‘It is 
okay to hit and kick others’’), facts (‘‘Rain is dry’’), tastes (‘‘Chocolate ice cream tastes yucky’’) 
and ambiguous facts (“The dog isn’t eating because it isn’t hungry’’). Ninety-six participants, 32 
at each age level, were first asked if they agreed with the statement and then were told about two 
imaginary characters who held opposing viewpoints (one character held the same belief as the 
participant and one held the opposing belief). Participants were then asked about subjectivity (is 
it possible for both characters to be right or only one?) and tolerance (is it acceptable for 
someone to have an opposing viewpoint to yours?). If the participant said “no” to the tolerance 
question then justification was tested (why is it not acceptable for someone to have an opposing 
viewpoint to yours?).  
 Participants responded to the subjectivity and tolerance questions with a “yes/no” 
response and to the justification question by explaining their reasons as to why it was 
unacceptable for others to hold opposing beliefs. For the justification question, the researchers 
coded participants’ responses for statements like, “I don’t agree with this person because her 
belief would cause harm/isn’t true/is subjective/isn’t fair/is incomplete.” Results showed that 
children became slightly more subjective and tolerant with age. But the much stronger effect was 
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from domain. Fewer than 10% of children were subjective or tolerant of opposing moral or 
factual beliefs whereas over 50% of children were subjective and tolerant of opposing beliefs in 
the ambiguous fact and taste domains. These findings supported the argument for domain 
specificity.  
 Responses about justification also were domain specific. Almost 100% of participants 
referred to concerns about welfare and fairness when explaining why opposing moral beliefs 
were unacceptable (‘‘Kicking other kids is mean because it hurts them, so what that kid said is 
just wrong, very wrong’’). In the factual domain nearly 100% discussed concerns about what 
was observably true (‘‘If she goed outside she’d see that rain is always wet, so her belief is all 
wrong’’). Tastes were most frequently said to be subjective (‘‘People have their own tastes, so 
both beliefs are right actually”) and children most often expressed concern at the difficulty of 
verifying ambiguous facts (‘‘It’s not like we can ask the dog if he’s hungry, so maybe this kid is 
right and the other kid is right too’’). 
A Close Examination of the Goodwin and Darley (2008) Paradigm 
 Research on adults also has shown domain specificity. As will become apparent, the 
present work was inspired, in large part, by a general methodological approach taken by 
Goodwin and Darley (2008). The primary goal of that research was to assess whether 
participants felt their belief was subjective/relative as opposed to objective/absolute across 
different domains. It is thus useful to consider their methodology and results in some detail.  
 Goodwin and Darley (2008) examined laypeople’s intuitions about objectivity with 
respect to four content domains. One domain pertained to factual beliefs (e.g., Boston [MA] is 
further north than Los Angeles [CA]). A second domain pertained to moral precepts (e.g., 
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robbing a bank in order to pay for an expensive holiday is a morally bad action). A third domain 
pertained to social conventions (e.g., Wearing pajamas and a bath robe to a seminar meeting is 
wrong behavior), and a fourth pertained to personal tastes (e.g., Frank Sinatra was a better singer 
than is Michael Bolton). The study was divided into two stages. 
 Stage 1:  In the first stage, participants rated the extent to which they personally agreed 
with various propositions in the different domains on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 6 (strongly agree). For each statement, after rating their agreement level, participants also 
categorized the statement as true, false, or opinion.  
 Stage 2:  In Stage 2, participants were presented with two ethical, one factual, one social 
convention, and one personal taste statement from Stage 1. Critically, in Stage 2, participants 
were presented only with statements from Stage 1 with which they had highly agreed or 
disagreed. That is, participants were presented with statements that they had rated either 1 or 2 
(indicating strong disagreement) or that they had rated either 5 or 6 (indicating strong 
agreement). For each statement that was presented in Stage 2, participants were (i) told that 
someone else in the study had disagreed with them about the statement and, based on this 
supposition, the participants were (ii) asked to select an option that best represented how they felt 
about that disagreement. Participants were given four choices to characterize how they felt about 
this disagreement:  (1) The other person is surely mistaken; (2) It is possible that neither you nor 
the other person is mistaken, (3) It could be that you are mistaken, and the other person is 
correct or (4) Other. 
 Some clarification and elaboration on the aforementioned scales is worth noting here. 
Choices 1 and 2 capture whether participants feel the truth of the statement is objective versus 
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subjective. Choice 1 was meant to capture objectivity. If a participant thought that anyone who 
disagreed with them was surely mistaken, then that participant must have believed that their own, 
exclusive understanding of the truth was absolute. However, choice 2 was meant to capture 
subjectivity. If a participant thought that it was possible that neither party was mistaken, then 
they must have thought that different versions of the truth were acceptable, or that truth was 
relative. Choice 3 also was meant to capture objectivity. If the truth is objective, then that means 
only one version can be correct. In the event that the participant was mistaken, that would mean 
that the disagreeing other would have to be correct. Choice 4 was meant to capture all other 
subjective cases where it is possible for someone to disagree, and yet neither party be mistaken.  
 Goodwin and Darley (2008) then created a measure of objectivity by combining the 
responses to the categorization question in Stage 1 with the responses to the 
subjectivity/objectivity question in Stage 2. This measure of objectivity had three levels: fully 
objective, intermediately objective, and least objective. The most objective response, termed 
“fully objective,” was defined as when the participant considered a particular statement true (or 
false) in Stage 1 and considered one who disagreed as surely mistaken in Stage 2. Fully objective 
was scored as a 3. “Intermediately objective” could result from a participant considering a 
particular statement true (or false) in Stage 1 but not seeing either party as surely mistaken in the 
case of disagreement in Stage 2. Alternatively, intermediately objective could result from a 
participant considering a statement to be an opinion in Stage 1, but feeling that anyone who 
disagreed was surely mistaken in Stage 2. Intermediately objective was scored as a 2. Finally, the 
least objective was defined as when a participant considered a statement to be an opinion in 
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Stage 1, and then didn’t regard anyone as surely mistaken in the case of a disagreement in Stage 
2. Least objective was scored as a 1.  
For example, suppose that a participant categorized the statement, “Frank Sinatra is a 
better singer than Michael Bolton” as true/false in Stage 1, and then indicated that the 
disagreeing other was “surely mistaken” in Stage 2. These responses, taken together, would 
represent a “fully objective” belief and be scored a 3. If another participant categorized the 
statement as true/false in Stage 1, but allowed for the possibility that the disagreeing other was 
not mistaken in Stage 2, then these responses would represent an “intermediately objective” 
belief and be scored a 2. If a participant categorized the statement as an opinion in Stage 1 and 
then allowed for the possibility that the disagreeing other was not mistaken in Stage 2, then these 
responses would represent the “least objective” belief, and be scored a 1.  
 Goodwin and Darley (2008) predicted that across factual, ethical, social convention, and 
taste statements, they would see a trend from most objective to least objective responses. Based 
on results using the three-point scale, their prediction was confirmed. Mean objectivity ratings 
were 2.91, 2.56, 2.00, and 1.56 for factual, ethical, social convention, and taste statements, 
respectively. ANOVA results confirmed a highly significant difference among all domain 
comparisons. Later, in a similar follow-up study, Goodwin and Darley (2012) showed that 
beliefs about negatively valenced moral acts (stealing a wallet) are seen as even more objective 
than beliefs about positively valenced acts (donating income). In addition, Goodwin and Darley 
(2012) asked participants to report the percentage of the population that they thought would 
agree with each statement. The reported level of expected agreement predicted objectivity ratings 
among participants. In other words, when participants predicted that most or all members of the 
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population would agree about a statement, they were more likely to feel that the particular 
statement was objectively true.  
 Goodwin and Darley (2008) inspired the methodology used in the current set of studies. 
Similarly, the present set of studies seeks to describe people’s understanding of features of their 
own knowledge, with a focus on religious and political versus factual beliefs. Like Goodwin and 
Darley, I first ask participants what they believe, but critically, follow up with questions about 
the nature of those beliefs.  
Summary of Domain Specificity Debate 
 The historical roots in developmental psychology focused folk epistemological research 
on domain-general developmental trends. Patterns of folk epistemological development 
undeniably exist, but domain-specific aspects cannot be ignored. Muis, Bendixen, and Haerle 
(2006) conducted a review of 19 studies revolving around folk epistemology. The studies 
included within- and between-participant designs, and tested children and adults. Furthermore, 
the studies looked at a wide range of epistemological concepts, including the structure of 
knowledge, certainty of knowledge, sources of knowledge, and justifications for knowing. Muis 
et al. (2006) found that 17 of the 19 studies provided clear support for domain specificity. The 
remaining two showed moderate support for a domain-general model.  
 Evidence for domain specificity in folk epistemology is clear, but the field still needs 
theoretical cohesion with respect to which domains of knowledge are of interest, and why. Some 
researchers are interested in different academic disciplines, hoping to inform the educational 
process, whereas others follow early theorists in parsing knowledge into moral beliefs, facts, and 
social conventions. Amidst the conversation surrounding domain specificity in folk 
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epistemology, one area of knowledge has been (perhaps surprisingly) underexplored, namely 
ideological beliefs. Religious belief has long occupied a unique niche in philosophical history, 
yet few psychologists have examined how laypeople think about their own religious knowledge. 
Similarly, the folk epistemology of political beliefs has not been directly studied.  
General Summary of the Background Literature 
 Folk epistemology is a field founded and formulated by developmental psychologists. 
These early thinkers developed methods and areas of interest that remain prominent today. The 
present research follows their lead by continuing to investigate the sources of knowledge, 
justification, certainty, objectivity of knowledge, tolerance of disagreement, and domain-specific 
intuitions about knowledge. Despite decades of research in folk epistemology, several major 
ideas from academic epistemology remain untested in laypeople. Theories of truth and 
justification have not yet been fully examined. The present research asks to what extent 
laypeople use these ideas when thinking about their own knowledge. Evidence for domain 
specificity in folk epistemology has been found in many previous studies, but understanding 
which domain differences are most interesting, and why they exist, remains an open project. 
Investigating two domains that have fascinating folk epistemological differences is a major goal 
of the present research. It is with this goal in mind that I consider why religious and political 
beliefs are of interest. 
1.3 Why Are Religious and Political Beliefs Interesting?  
 Several factors motivated the study of folk epistemology of religious and political beliefs. 
In addition to being historically underexplored, these domains embody fascinating and 
mysterious epistemological features, making them ideal candidates for investigation. For 
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example, many religious beliefs violate normative epistemological standards. That is, religious 
beliefs often are unverifiable, unfalsifiable, not based on evidence, and may not correspond to 
any state of the world or cohere with other propositions that the believer has determined to be 
true. Our intuitive epistemological standards also are violated by religious propositions. 
According to Boyer (2001), religious beliefs are by definition counterintuitive in the sense that 
they violate our folk ontological systems for understanding the world. Consider a belief that a 
spirit can walk through a solid wall. This proposition violates our folk physics which tells us that 
normally, objects cannot move through one another. In this sense, religious beliefs are 
automatically represented as strange and fantastic, even to those who believe them to be true.  
 Another interesting feature is that religious propositions are often considered to be 
obviously false by all, except those who believe them. For example, some Appalachian churches 
in the United States believe that bites from venomous snakes are harmless to believers (Hood & 
Williamson, 2008). This belief is demonstrably false, evidenced by the hospitalization and even 
death of snakebite victims. How do believers intuitively think about the truth of a proposition 
that is so obviously false to everyone else? Even large, organized traditions make claims that 
non-believers unhesitatingly find to be totally unconvincing. Put another way, we are all atheists 
with respect to every god except our own (Dawkins, 2016). How are religious propositions 
obviously false to some and simultaneously true to others?  
 Political beliefs are similar in some ways to religious beliefs in that they do not rely on 
normative epistemological standards of justification and truth. For instance, political groups have 
established platforms of beliefs without theoretical connections from one belief to the next 
(lacking coherence). Believers may support theoretically conflicting positions, for example, 
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being “pro-life” when it comes to abortions, and simultaneously in favor of the death penalty 
(Kahan, 1999).  
 Significantly, the believer’s group membership in a politically relevant group predicts 
belief more than the content of the proposition. For example, Cohen (2003) asked Republican 
and Democrat participants how they felt about welfare. Cohen found that Democrats favored a 
relatively “generous” version of this policy compared to Republicans. That is, Democrats tended 
to support awarding recipients more money compared to Republicans. Participants then were 
assigned to one of four conditions in which they read about a proposed welfare policy. Cohen 
varied the amount of benefits recipients would receive, namely $800 (“generous”) versus $200 
(“stringent”) per month. Cohen also varied whether participants were told that Republicans or 
Democrats supported the policy. Results showed that participants overwhelmingly supported the 
policies that their own political group approved of, independent of whether the policy was 
generous or stringent.  In a follow-up experiment, participants were even shown the proposed 
policies side by side with information that Republicans/Democrats supported the 
generous/stringent policy, respectively. Even when all information about both possible policies 
was available, participants still preferred the policy that their group supported. In addition, when 
asked, participants reported that their group affiliation did not influence their decision 
whatsoever, and that their determination was based purely on an impartial consideration of the 
facts. Interestingly, participants were certain that the group affiliation did influence decisions 
made by their political opponents. In particular, Democrats denied that partisanship played a role 
in their own judgments, even while asserting that such bias played a role in the judgments made 
by Republicans, and Republican participants showed the mirror image of this effect. In short, 
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participants believed that their own judgments were unbiased, but that judgments made by others 
were biased. These findings demonstrate both the departure from normative epistemological 
standards of justification and the significance of group affiliation in forming political beliefs.  
 When considering other political issues such as gun control or affirmative action, 
therefore, these findings suggest that people will be biased in terms of how they process 
arguments and evidence. Opposing arguments are subjected to extreme skepticism whereas 
supporting arguments are accepted with little scrutiny. When people are allowed to choose how 
to direct their own time and attention, they do not attempt to falsify their political beliefs and 
instead focus on seeking confirmatory evidence (Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009; Taber & 
Lodge, 2006). The departure from unbiased evidentialism in evaluating political policies 
suggests the possibility of fascinating underlying folk epistemology in the political domain.  
 In addition to religious and political beliefs not adhering to epistemological principles, 
these beliefs also influence a variety of social consequences including friendships, mating 
opportunities, social status, political leadership, and intergroup conflict. In turn, these effects 
mean that even if the contents of the religious or political propositions do not impact the world 
(e.g., doing a rain dance may not actually cause rain), there are nevertheless real costs and 
benefits associated with belief/disbelief (e.g., believing that a rain dance causes rain may have an 
impact on social bonding). Conversely, other domains have no social consequences. For 
example, people are not concerned about others’ beliefs about the viscosity of water or the 
wavelength of light. This difference in social consequences, between religious and political 
beliefs on the one hand and factual beliefs on the other, motivates the comparison of folk 
epistemology across these domains.  
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 Examples of the social consequences of religious and political beliefs can be seen all 
around us, but they have also been found in the laboratory. Members of religious groups and 
political parties disproportionately behave altruistically toward one another and harmfully toward 
outgroups. Bulbulia and Mahoney (2008) found that in a modified Dictator Game, Christian 
dictators gave more benefits to Christian compared to non-Christian recipients. Moreover, in a 
key condition, recipients were given the opportunity to incur a cost in order to reduce the payoff 
to other participants in the experiment. Christian recipients who chose to incur a cost in order to 
reduce the payoff to non-Christians were rewarded the most by Christian dictators.  
 People show a preference to not associate with members of outgroup religious traditions 
(Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003). The world over, religion motivates intergroup conflict, and 
battles are sometimes fought over the most minor religious disagreements (Harris, 2005). 
Religious and political affiliations also influence people’s mating markets; they determine who is 
a potential mate, and what courting and mating behaviors are acceptable (Kurzban, Dukes, & 
Weeden, 2010; Li, Cohen, Weeden, & Kenrick, 2010).  
 For better or for worse, political and religious belief is used to determine coalition 
affiliation and to make assumptions about the believer. In one of the few folk epistemological 
studies looking at ideological beliefs, 8- to 10-year-old participants were asked to consider four 
types of belief statements: true facts, religious beliefs, untrue facts, and opinions. The 
participants were asked if the belief statement revealed more information about the world in 
general or about the believer. Religious beliefs, opinions, and untrue facts were said to offer 
more information about the believer whereas true factual beliefs revealed more about the world 
(Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris, & Banaji, 2014). 
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1.4 Summary of Motivation for the Current Research 
 The study of folk epistemology has illuminated several features of human intuitions about 
knowledge, but several academic epistemological concepts remain unexplored in laypeople. The 
current research aims to determine the extent to which laypeople think about or rely on these 
concepts when forming their own beliefs. The folk epistemology of religious and political beliefs 
has also been underexplored. These domains are particularly fascinating because of a number of 
features suggestive of unique folk epistemology. These beliefs depart from normative 
epistemological standards, are obviously false to many, are the result of biased reasoning 
processes, and influence social consequences. All of these reasons motivate the investigation of 
academic and other epistemological concepts, comparing the religious and political domains to 
the factual domain.  
1.5 Outline of Studies  
 In a series of seven studies, the current research aims to answer several questions, all of 
which revolve around the folk epistemology of beliefs within three domains: religious, political, 
and factual. In order to investigate the questions of interest, all of the studies asked participants 
to reflect on statements that they believed to be true. There were three types of statements: 
religious (e.g., Jesus walked on water without sinking), political (e.g., A powerful military is 
necessary to protect American interests), and factual (e.g., A square has four right angles). The 
major goals are to examine academic epistemological principles in laypeople and to explore 
whether domain-specific differences exist in the folk epistemology of religious and political 
versus factual beliefs. Below, I briefly summarize the questions and goals of each study to 
provide an outline of the research. Specific hypotheses, methods, results, and conclusions, 
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however, are explained later. It is important to keep in mind that the first two investigations, 
Studies 1 and 2, represent “table-setting” studies, intended to provide the foundation for the 
remaining five studies.  
Study 1  
 The goal of the first study was to show that participants could reliably sort the target 
statements into one of three categories (i.e., “religious,” “political,” and “factual”). This goal was 
important, in order to verify that each of the statements clearly conveyed its intended meaning 
and implication with respect to the three categories in question.  
Study 2 
 Study 2 had two goals. The first goal was to validate the statements that would be used in 
Studies 3-7. In order to ensure that religious and political statements had the intended meaning to 
participants, it was important to demonstrate a correlation between belief that these statements 
were true and accepted measures of religiosity and political orientation. Study 2 also explored 
how people think about resolving uncertainty. Is uncertainty more difficult to resolve in the 
political and religious domains than in the factual domain?  
Study 3 
 Study 3 explored the epistemological concept of verification. Do people think their 
religious, political, and factual beliefs are verifiable? Do they think evidence and verification are 
the best ways to establish truth? The goal of Study 3 was to investigate how laypeople rely on 
verification when determining truth across different domains. 
Study 4 
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 Study 4 explored the epistemological concept of falsification. Do people think their 
religious, political, and factual beliefs are falsifiable? Do they think evidence and falsification 
are the best ways to establish truth? The goal of Study 4 was to investigate how laypeople rely on 
falsification when determining truth across different domains.   
Study 5 
 Study 5 explored academic theories of truth in laypeople. In particular, the goal of Study 
5 was to investigate how laypeople use academic conceptions of truth and justification, and also 
to demonstrate differences across domains of knowledge. Study 5 included questions like: When 
considering why religious, political, and factual beliefs are true, which theory of truth do people 
rely on – correspondence, coherence, or pragmatic? To what extent do people rely on trust in the 
testimony of others or faith? How important is indoctrination from a young age for forming 
beliefs in the religious, political, and factual domains?  
Study 6 
 Study 6 explored the concept of objectivity and tolerance for opposing beliefs in others. 
The primary goals were to investigate the extent to which people feel their beliefs are objectively 
versus subjectively true, and to determine if there are differences across domains. Study 6 also 
explored how people tolerate disagreement. 
Study 7 
 Study 7 looked beyond academic concepts and explored various intuitions about 
knowledge related to truth and certainty. The goal of Study 7 was to evaluate whether religious 
and political beliefs violate not only academic standards but also intuitive standards of truth and 
justification. Study 7 explored several aspects of certainty and belief, including how much effort 
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is required to believe, how obvious and reasonable propositions are, if people doubt their beliefs, 
and about the distinction between “knowing” versus “believing.” Furthermore, Study 7 examined 
people’s reactions to counterarguments across the three domains.   
1.6 A Note on the Sampling Technique Used in the Present Research 
 Participants for all studies were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk.com), a website where businesses or individuals, known as “requesters,” can post tasks 
for individuals, known as “workers,” to complete in exchange for money. The tasks, referred to 
as “Human Intelligence Tasks” (HITs), require human intelligence because equivalent machine 
intelligence is either unavailable or too costly to develop. For example, a typical HIT might 
involve determining whether photographs for a proposed catalogue are inappropriate – trivially 
easy for most humans but currently impossible for machines.  
 MTurk has become a popular site to hire workers to complete surveys and social science 
experiments. Participants voluntarily select a HIT and complete it from their own computer. 
Several studies have compared the quality of data obtained through MTurk, in-person 
questionnaires, experiments completed on computer at a lab, and face-to-face interviews. 
Consistently, findings have shown that data from MTurk workers are relatively indistinguishable 
or even superior to that obtained from American undergraduates (Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). In addition, MTurk workers tend to be older, 
more ethnically and socioeconomically diverse, and have more work experience. MTurk is an 
established and reliable tool for social scientists to gather data (Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & 
Wiebe, 2011; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013).   
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Chapter 2: Study 1 – Categorizing Statements 
 The overall goal of Study 1 was to verify that people consistently categorize statements 
as factual, religious, or political, and to generate ten statements within each domain to be used in 
Studies 2-7. Previous research on folk epistemology has often used statements from different 
domains like moral judgment, social convention, personal taste, factual, religious, etc. (Goodwin 
& Darley, 2008; Heiphetz et al., 2014). In the previous research, however, no procedure was 
used to ensure that laypeople intuit the domain of the statements as intended by the researchers. 
Study 1 was designed to do just that. 
2.1 Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1A: Overall, many of the statements will be reliably categorized (enough to 
proceed with Studies 2-7) with a high level of consistency (more than 75% of the participants 
will categorize a statement as belonging to a specific domain).  
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
 163 Americans (99 males) over the age of 18 (mean age = 37.09) participated in Study 1.  
2.2.2 Procedure and Measures 
 After providing informed consent, participants were instructed that they would read 
statements and be asked to categorize each statement into one of four categories: Religious, 
Political, Factual, or Other. Following the instructions, participants were presented with 93 
statements, in random order, and were asked to categorize each statement, one at a time. The 
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intended categories were 30 political (e.g., “Open homosexuality makes the military weaker”), 
30 factual (e.g., “Coca Cola is a brand of soda”), 22 religious (e.g., “Jesus walked on water 
without sinking”), and 11 other (e.g., “Chocolate is better than vanilla”). For all religious, 
political, and factual statements, participants were randomly presented with either a statement or 
its opposite, but not both. For example, any given participant would see “God exists” or “God 
does not exist,” but not both. A full list of statements and their opposites is shown in Appendix 1.  
 The political statements were designed to be meaningful to an American population and 
were inspired by websites like http://www.democratichub.com/issues.aspx, which lists current 
political issues. Both left-wing and right-wing statements were used. The religious statements 
referred primarily to Christian concepts and stories (e.g., “Jesus,” “Mary,” etc.), although some 
statements applied to concepts from other traditions as well (e.g., “God,” “Souls,” etc.). The 
factual statements were straightforward statements about the world, although many of them were 
false and some were deliberately designed such that the participant would be uncertain if they 
were true or false. The “Other” category was composed of statements about values, opinions, or 
nonsense. 
 Importantly, the religious and political statements were deliberately designed such that 
they referred to states of the world as opposed to personal values or opinions. For example, 
rather than the political statement saying “It is wrong for the military to allow open 
homosexuality” (a statement about a value judgment), the statement said “Open homosexuality 
makes the military weaker” (a statement about the world). In order to test epistemological 
intuitions consistently across all domains, it was critical that all statements referred to states of 
the world. If religious and political statements had referred to values or opinions, then several of 
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the comparisons across domains would not be possible. For example, a value statement 
(“Homosexuality is wrong”) is not verifiable without an accompanying universal definition of 
wrongness. However, a statement referring to the world (“Open homosexuality makes the 
military weaker”) is theoretically verifiable. For a full list of statements and intended categories 
see Appendix 1.  
2.3 Results 
 There were a total of 175 unique statements presented to participants, composed of 30 
political (and 30 opposites), 30 factual (and 30 opposites), 22 religious (and 22 opposites), and 
11 other (no opposites). The percentage of participants who categorized each statement in the 
same category was calculated for each of the 175 statements. Hypothesis 1A was confirmed. 
Twenty-three of the political, 33 factual, and 40 religious statements were categorized as 
intended by at least 75% of participants (see Appendix 1). These statements were identified for 
possible use in Studies 2-7.  
2.4 Study 1 Discussion 
 In previous research on folk epistemology, researchers asked participants to respond to 
statements in different domains. In these previous studies, however, researchers generated the 
statements and decided on their own which domains the statements represented. In the current 
research, participants were asked to categorize the statements in order to ensure that the 
statements were understood as intended.  
 Moreover, because all statements were about the world, it was entirely possible that 
participants could have categorized them all as facts. For example, the statement “Jesus walked 
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on water without sinking” could be considered just as much a fact as “Michael Phelps swam in 
water without sinking.”  Study 1 ensured that participants understood the intended domains of 
the statements that would be used in Studies 2-7. Study 1 generated statements that were 
categorized in the intended domain by at least 75% of participants.  
 Based on the percentage of statements categorized as intended, it would appear that 
participants found religious statements to be the most consistently identifiable (90% of religious 
statements were categorized as intended by at least 75% of participants). The next most 
consistently categorized were factual statements (55% of factual statements were categorized as 
intended by at least 75% of participants).  Lastly, 38% of political statements were categorized as 
intended by at least 75% of participants.  Some of the factual statements were false (e.g., “Limes 
are a poor source of vitamin C”). False facts seemed to confuse participants, often being 
categorized as “other,” perhaps because participants interpreted “fact” as meaning “true” (even 
though the instructions said not to equate “fact” with “true”). Participants also appeared to use 
particular terms to help them categorize statements. For example, in the political domain, 
statements explicitly referring to the country or government institutions were among the most 
consistently categorized as political. Finally, several statements that were intended to be political 
were categorized by a significant proportion of participants as factual. This confusion between 
the intended category (political) and what participants understood (factual) was exactly the 
problem that Study 1 was designed to detect. These statements were not used in Studies 2-7. 
Only statements that were consistently categorized as intended by at least 75% of participants 
were used in Studies 2-7. 
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Chapter 3: Study 2 – Resolving Uncertainty 
 The goal of Study 2 was to determine if religiosity and political orientation, as measured 
by the New Indices of Religious Orientation (Francis, 2007) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
(Altemeyer, 2007) scales, respectively, correlated with the extent to which participants reported 
that religious and political, but not factual statements, were true. In other words, Study 2 
evaluated whether scores on the NIRO predicted how certain one was that religious statements 
were true, and whether scores on the RWA predicted how certain one was that political 
statements were true. (The NIRO scale is composed of three independent subscales: the extrinsic, 
intrinsic, and quest orientations. For all analyses involving the NIRO, the intrinsic orientation 
score was used. The intrinsic orientation deals with the personal belief aspect of religiosity, 
which is most relevant to the current research.) 
 The purpose of measuring these correlations was to validate the materials that would be 
used in Studies 3-7. It was important not only that participants could recognize the domain of the 
statement (accomplished in Study 1) but also that the statements were shown to be religiously or 
politically meaningful to participants.  In addition, Study 2 sought to demonstrate that 
participants find uncertainty to be more difficult to resolve in the religious and political domains 
than in the factual domain. More specifically, the prediction in Study 2 was that factual 
uncertainty arises from a lack of necessary information, whereas religious (and to a lesser extent 
political) uncertainty arises from an “unknowableness” of religious (and political) propositions. 
For example, if one is uncertain whether Tokyo is north or south of Philadelphia, one need only 
consult a map to find the answer. However, if one is uncertain about whether God exists or not, 
this uncertainty cannot be resolved by simple, available information.  
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Resolving uncertainty offers a window into how participants think about acquiring 
knowledge. If one finds uncertainty easy to resolve, it is because the proposition can be verified 
by an observation in the world, its logical coherence can be evaluated, or some other readily 
available method can be employed. Conversely, if one finds uncertainty difficult or impossible to 
resolve, it signals a sense that the proposition is unknowable.  
3.1 Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 2A: Certainty that religious statements are true will correlate positively with 
one’s NIRO score, and certainty that political statements are true will correlate positively with 
one’s RWA score.  
 Hypothesis 2B: Participants will report that uncertainty in the religious domain is the 
most difficult to resolve, followed by the political and then by the factual domain.  
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
 158 Americans (104 males) over the age of 18 (mean age = 38.44), recruited from MTurk 
participated in Study 2.  
3.2.2 Procedure and Measures 
 After consenting to participate in the study, participants were presented with 30 
statements in random order (10 religious, 10 political, and 10 factual), chosen from Study 1 
based on being categorized in the intended domain by at least 75% of participants in Study 1. 
After participants read each statement, they were asked the following questions: 
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 Question 1: “Without doing any research, how certain are you that the following 
statement is true or false?”  
 Participants indicated their degree of certainty by moving a slider, labeled as follows: 
Left (0): “Extremely certain it’s false”; middle (50): “Uncertain”; right (100): “Extremely certain 
it’s true.” The slider did not display any numbers to the participant in order to avoid consistency 
bias (this was the case for all sliders in all studies). The starting position of the slider was in the 
middle (50). Figure 1 shows an image of the slider.  
 
Figure 1. Example of a slider used in the studies 
 Question 2: “Sometimes you are uncertain about the truth of a statement but it is very 
easy to resolve your uncertainty. For example, consider the statement, “It is raining in Tokyo 
right now.”  You are probably uncertain whether this statement is true or false, but you could 
easily resolve your uncertainty by looking up a weather report for Tokyo. However, sometimes 
uncertainty is very difficult to resolve. For example, consider the statement, “Before time, there 
was no universe and no physical matter.” If you were uncertain whether this is true or false, you 
probably could not resolve your uncertainty with easily available information. Considering the 
current statement below, how easy/difficult would it be to resolve uncertainty about whether this 
statement is true or false?” 
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 Participants indicated how easy/difficult it would be to resolve uncertainty about the 
statement by moving a slider. The slider was labeled as follows: Left: “Extremely easy to 
resolve”; middle: “Moderate”; right: “Extremely difficult to resolve.” The starting position of the 
slider was set in the middle. After providing their ratings for the 30 statements, participants 
completed the NIRO (see Appendix 4), RWA (see Appendix 5), and demographic (see Appendix 
6) questionnaires and were thanked for their participation in the study.  
 For a list of statements used in Study 2, see Appendix 2. In the factual domain, 
statements included those that are obviously true, obviously false, and uncertain. In the religious 
and political domains, most statements were “pro-religious” and right wing, and some were 
“anti-religious” and left wing. The anti-religious and left-wing statements are marked with an 
“(R)” after them in Appendix 2. These statements were reverse scored for certain analyses. 
3.3 Results 
 Responses to question 1 (certainty of truth) were averaged across statements within the 
same domain for each participant. This process generated a mean certainty-of-truth value for 
each domain (religious, political, factual) for each participant. The same process was completed 
for responses from question 2. Statements P1, P4, and R9 were reverse scored in order to remain 
consistent (right wing vs. left wing in the political domain, and religious vs. anti-religious in the 
religious domain).  
RWA and NIRO scores were calculated for each participant. Correlations between mean 
certainty scores and the RWA and NIRO scores were calculated for each domain. As may be 
seen in Table 2, scores on both the RWA and the NIRO were significantly correlated with 
participants’ certainty of the truth of statements in both the political and religious domains. There 
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was no significant relation between RWA and NIRO scores and degree of certainty as to the 
truth of factual statements.  
Table 2. Correlations between mean certainty of truth and RWA and NIRO scores 
Scale Religious Political Factual 
RWA .634*** .572 *** -0.09 
NIRO 0.809*** 0.349*** -0.011 
Note. * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
 
 The mean difficulty-to-resolve-uncertainty scores for each participant and each domain 
were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA as the dependent variable. The independent 
variable was domain (political, religious, factual). As may be seen in Table 3, there was a large 
difference in mean difficulty to resolve uncertainty, between the domains. There was a 
statistically significant effect of domain on difficulty-to-resolve-uncertainty score F(2, 156) = 
214.20, p < .001. All pairwise comparisons showed a significant difference, p < .001 in all cases. 
Furthermore, as predicted, participants reported that religious uncertainty was the most difficult 
to resolve followed by political followed by factual.  
 
Table 3. Mean difficulty (SE) to resolve uncertainty and standard error according to domain 
Domain Mean difficulty (SE) to resolve uncertainty 
Factual 11.72 (1.46) 
Political 49.72 (1.37) 
Religious 62.12 (2.44) 
 
3.4 Study 2 Discussion 
 The primary finding from Study 2 was that people think of uncertainty differently across 
the three domains tested. Factual uncertainty is seen as easily resolved, whereas political and 
religious uncertainty are judged as more difficult to resolve. Because participants think of 
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uncertainty so differently, it can be inferred that they also think of certainty differently. This 
difference among domains supports the argument that religious (and some political) beliefs are 
based on intuitive standards/principles different from those of factual beliefs. For example, some 
form of verification is often used to determine if factual propositions are true whereas 
verification is less often the basis for believing a religious proposition to be true. The relatively 
high degree of difficulty to resolve political and religious uncertainty signals that participants 
don’t feel those forms of knowledge can be acquired as easily and these domains are more 
unknowable. Studies 3-7 test many of the specific differences in intuitive theories/principles that 
people use to think about their own knowledge across the three domains.  
 Study 2 also showed that the statements used were valid and served their intended 
purpose. Specifically, certainty that religious and political statements were true correlated with 
two well-known scales of political orientation and religiosity – the RWA and NIRO. If it had 
turned out that belief that the statements were true did not correlate with scores on the RWA or 
the NIRO, then the meaning of the statements to participants would have been unclear. Because 
religiosity and right-wing political orientation are highly correlated with each other, correlations 
between religious certainty and RWA score and political certainty and NIRO score also were 
observed. However, the overall goal to show that the statements have religious or political 
meaning was accomplished.   
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Chapter 4: Study 3 – Verification 
 The purpose of Study 3 was to investigate the epistemological concept of verification in 
laypeople. Do laypeople think verification is important when determining what is true? Do they 
think their beliefs are theoretically verifiable? Study 3 sought to demonstrate that laypeople 
substantially rely on verification and they believe it to be an important component of justification 
(the process for establishing what is true). More specifically, the prediction was that laypeople 
believe that facts can be theoretically verified more than political beliefs, and that religious 
beliefs are the least theoretically verifiable. This prediction follows from the view that political 
and religious beliefs are less likely to depend on any state of the world or be justifiable through 
evidence. Conversely, they are more likely to be acquired through the testimony of others, 
particularly at a young age. For example, a belief like “Jesus is the son of God” may be 
vigorously debated, but there is unlikely to be a state of the world that could satisfactorily 
determine who is correct.  
 Another prediction in Study 3 was that highly religious individuals would value 
verification less as a means of determining truth. This prediction was based on the idea that a 
religious worldview involves non-normative methods for determining truth, such as revelation 
and faith. Devaluing verification could be a way to reconcile the problem that propositions are 
true, but nevertheless cannot be verified. For example, consider the belief that snake venom is 
not harmful to Christians. There is no supporting evidence for this belief, and yet some people 
believe it to be true, enough to motivate them to handle and be bitten by snakes. It is possible 
that in order to reconcile the information from the world (snake bites are dangerous) with their 
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conflicting belief (snake bites are harmless), believers would devalue verification as an 
epistemological tool and, instead, rely on faith.  
4.1 Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 3A: Facts will be said to be theoretically verifiable most frequently, followed 
by political and then religious statements.  
 Hypothesis 3B: There will be a negative correlation between scores on the NIRO and 
responses to questions 2 and 3 (i.e., whether verifiability is necessary for knowing a proposition 
is true and whether observable evidence in the world is the best proof that a proposition is true).  
 Hypothesis 3C: When asked generally (not with respect any statement in particular), 
participants will respond that, on average, verifiability is necessary in order to know a statement 
is true and that evidence in the world as the best form of proof.  
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
 160 Americans (108 males) over the age of 18 (mean age = 40.46 years old), recruited 
from MTurk, completed the study. 
4.2.2 Procedure and Measures 
Procedure for Part 1 of Studies 3-7  
 Studies 3-7 all included two parts. Part 1 for Studies 3-7 was identical. In Part 1, 
participants were presented with 30 statements in random order, ten statements from each of the 
three domains – political, factual, and religious (see Appendix 3 for a list of all statements). 
38 
 
 
 
 
These 30 statements had been derived from Studies 1 and 2. Along with each of the 30 
statements, participants were asked the following question:  
 Question 1: “Without doing any research, how certain are you that the following 
statement is true?”  
 To respond, participants adjusted a slider from “Extremely uncertain” (0) to “Extremely 
certain” (100), with “Moderately certain” (50) at the midpoint. The slider’s starting position was 
at 0, under “Extremely uncertain” (see Fig. 1). 
 After answering question 1 for all 30 statements, Part 1 was complete, and participants 
proceeded to Part 2. In Part 2, up to six statements from Part 1 (two religious, two political, and 
two factual) were presented again to the participant. Only statements that the participant had 
indicated were very certainly true (rated at least 85/100 on question 1 in Part 1) were selected 
from Part 1 to be presented again in Part 2. If a participant didn’t rate at least two statements as 
very certainly true (≥ 85) in a particular domain, then less than two statements were tested for 
that domain in Part 2 (either 1 or 0 statements). If more than two statements were rated as very 
certainly true from a particular domain, then only two statements were selected randomly for use 
in Part 2. This method of selecting statements from Part 1 for use in Part 2 was identical for 
Studies 3-7 and is depicted in Figure 2. After each statement was presented again in Part 2, the 
participant was asked epistemological questions about that statement (e.g. “Do you think this 
statement is verifiable?”). The “Folk Epistemology Questions” in Figure 2 represents the 
epistemological questions that went with each statement presented in Part 2. The exact questions 
that made up the “Folk Epistemology Questions” differed across Studies 3-7, but the general 
flow and structure of all the studies was the same. It is to be recalled that even though the slider 
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depicted in Figure 2 shows numbers, no numbers were shown to the participants in any of the 
studies.  
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Figure 2. Diagram of the procedure for Studies 3-7. 
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 After responding to all of the questions, participants completed the NIRO (see Appendix 
4), RWA (see Appendix 5), and demographic (see Appendix 6) questionnaires, and were thanked 
for their participation in the study. 
Epistemological Comparisons Across Domains in Studies 3-7 
 Studies 3-7 investigated folk epistemological differences among the religious, political, 
and factual domains. The overarching question that these studies examined was: do people 
believe religious propositions (e.g., "God exists") or political propositions (e.g., “Most people on 
welfare are abusing the system rather than looking for work”) in the same way that they believe 
facts (e.g., "Maine is north of Florida")?  
 On the one hand, people take their religious and political beliefs very seriously. They 
make important decisions based on them, like who they should marry, which medical treatments 
they should seek, and which politicians they should support. People may point to personal 
experiences as a source of religious and political belief. These observations suggest that people 
represent their religious and political beliefs as equally verifiable, based on evidence, and as 
objectively true, as factual beliefs. On the other hand, people also resist evidence that pertains to 
these beliefs, adopt the religious and political propositions of their ingroup, and readily identify 
outgroup beliefs as obviously false. These observations seem to indicate that people view 
religious and political beliefs as categorically distinct from everyday facts. 
 Based on these opposing perspectives, it was not known in advance how people would 
respond to epistemological questions about their religious, political, and factual beliefs. 
Nevertheless, in Studies 3-7, the general prediction was made that participants differentially 
think about the underlying epistemology for religious, political, and factual statements. For 
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example, in Study 3, it was predicted that factual statements would be viewed as most verifiable, 
followed by political, and then religious statements. In other studies, predictions were made 
about falsification, correspondence, obviousness, doubt, objectivity, and other concepts. In all 
studies, the prediction was that people view religious and political beliefs as epistemologically 
distinct from facts.   
 Moreover, several methodical measures were taken to ensure that valid comparisons of 
folk epistemology could be made across domains. One goal of these measures was to prevent 
participants from evaluating religious, political, and factual statements on the features that made 
them simply, by definition, distinct. For example, the statement, “Strawberry ice cream is the 
best flavor” is by definition subjective whereas, “Strawberry ice cream melts at a temperature of 
70 degrees Fahrenheit,” is by definition objective.  In order to minimize investigating purely 
definitional differences, all statements used in the research referred to the world as opposed to 
values or opinions. Hence they were theoretically, epistemologically equivalent across a number 
of dimensions (e.g., they were all theoretically verifiable). For example, the political statement, 
“The right to own guns makes society safer,” and the factual statement, “Germs are very small,” 
are equally verifiable and falsifiable. They can be equally evaluated for their correspondence to 
the world, coherence with other truth, and pragmatism.  
 Other methodological considerations were made to increase the validity of the 
comparisons across domains. Where necessary, participants were instructed to consider the 
epistemological concept “theoretically” (e.g., in Study 3 participants were asked if statements 
were theoretically verifiable). This instruction was meant to prevent participants from 
responding to whether a proposition was difficult versus easy to verify in practice.  
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 Certainty of truth was also controlled for in order to prevent lack of certainty from 
affecting underlying folk epistemology. In Part 2 of Studies 3-7, participants only reflected upon 
statements that they individually had rated in Part 1 as very certainly true (at least 85/100 in Part 
1). Hence, the religious and political statements were never treated differently by participants 
due to a lack of explicit certainty that they were true. In other words, all responses to the folk 
epistemology questions in Part 2, were from participants who were very certain the target 
statement was true.  
 Finally, for political and religious statements, it was entirely possible that participants 
would refrain from responding in any way that could be interpreted as betraying uncertainty or 
lack of belief, due to the negative feelings such an event might cause. Questions were designed 
to be indirect and phrased to avoid causing participants to respond defensively.  
 Given these points, it was not obvious how participants would answer the 
epistemological questions about factual, political, and religious statements in Studies 3-7. 
Conceivably, it could have been the case that people viewed religious and political truth as 
identical in nature to factual truth. Alternatively it could be that, as predicted, laypeople are 
intuitively aware of a variety of departures from normative epistemology underlying their 
religious and political beliefs. In addition, measures were taken to ensure that valid comparisons 
of folk epistemology were made across domains, illuminating more than merely definitional 
differences in statements.   
Study 3 Procedure and Measures 
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 In Study 3, the “Folk Epistemology Questions” component from Figure 2 was designed 
to test verification, and consisted of the following instructions and questions that were presented 
to participants:  
 “Some statements can be proven to be true while others cannot. Please note, this is not 
the same as whether a statement actually is true or not. In Part 2, we are not interested in whether 
you think a statement is true or not. We are only interested in whether you think it is possible to 
prove the statement to be true. To help understand what we mean, please consider examples in 
the table below.    
Statement Conditions that would prove it to be true Possible to prove true? 
There is intelligent life 
on the moon 
Astronauts travel to the moon and find intelligent 
life there. (Please note, this statement is false, but it 
is possible to prove it to be true.) 
Yes 
It is dark outside where 
you are now You look outside and see it is dark. Yes 
The number of hairs on 
your body is even 
With other people’s help, you count every single 
hair on your body. (Please note: even though this 
would be very difficult, it is theoretically possible to 
count every hair on your body.) 
Yes 
If Abraham Lincoln had 
never been assassinated, 
the world would be a 
better place 
To prove this statement to be true you would need to 
change something that has already occurred, which 
is not even theoretically possible. 
No 
 
  Consider the following statement from Part 1: [Here one of the statements from Part 1 
appeared]. Question 1: Do you think it is theoretically possible to prove that this statement is 
true?” Participants could respond with a “yes” or a “no” to the question about verification.  
After completing the Folk Epistemology Questions component (Part 2), participants in Study 3 
then were asked two additional questions: 
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 Question 2: “To what extent do you agree with the following statement: In order to know 
a statement is true, it must be theoretically possible to prove it to be true.” 
 Question 3: “To what extent do you agree with the following statement: The best proof 
that a statement is true is evidence that people can observe in the world.” 
Both questions allowed the participant to respond with a slider from 0 – “Totally disagree” to 
100 – “Totally agree.” All sliders did not display numbers, only words.  
4.3 Results 
 In Part 1 of the study, some participants did not indicate that they were highly certain that 
any statement was true for at least one of the domains. In other words, referring to Figure 2, one 
or more of the “hats” was empty when transitioning from Part 1 to Part 2. Hence, in Part 2, these 
participants only responded to epistemological questions about two or fewer domains. It was 
preferable to have at least one data point for each participant for each domain in Part 2, so these 
participants were excluded from the analyses, leaving 109 participants (78 males).  
 Participants responded to question 1 with a yes/no response, as to whether a statement 
was verifiable or not. A chi-square analysis was used to determine if there were significantly 
more “yes” versus “no” responses comparing across domains. As predicted, the highest 
percentage of participants responded that factual statements were verifiable, followed by political 
statements, followed by religious statements (see Fig. 3; chi square = 151.082, df = 2, p < .0001). 
All pairwise comparisons were statistically significantly different: Political vs. religious chi 
square = 52.02, df = 1, p < .0001; political vs. factual chi square = 26.79, df = 1, p < .0001; 
factual vs. religious chi square = 133.81, df = 1, p < .0001). 
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Figure 3: Frequency of “yes” responses to verification question 
 
 Mean slider responses and standard error for questions 2 and 3 are presented in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Mean slider responses (SE) to questions 2 and 3 
Question 2 and 3: To what extent do you agree with the following 
statement? 
Mean Response (SE) 
In order to know a statement is true, it must be theoretically possible to 
prove it to be true. 
69.61 (3.32) 
The best proof that a statement is true is evidence that people can 
observe in the world. 
76.03 (2.86) 
 
 Scores on the NIRO were significantly negatively correlated with the slider responses on 
questions 2 and 3. The correlation between NIRO score and question 2 was -.38 (p < .0001) and 
between NIRO score and question 3 was -.46 (p < .0001).  
 To check for effects of religiosity and political orientation on responses to question 1 
(Part 2), first the average number of “yes” responses was calculated for religious statements and 
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for political statements. Then a correlation was calculated between the NIRO score and average 
number of “yes” responses to religious statements. There was no significant correlation, r = .10, 
p = .28. There was a weak, but significant correlation found between RWA scores and average 
number of “yes” responses to question 1 with respect to political statements, r = .20, p = .04. 
4.4 Study 3 Discussion 
 Study 3 tested how people think about verification with respect to political, religious, and 
factual beliefs, and results confirmed all three hypotheses.  Hypothesis 3A was supported: factual 
statements were most frequently said to be verifiable, followed by political, followed by 
religious statements. This finding was the primary goal of Study 3, and supports the argument 
that religious and political beliefs depend relatively less on evidentialism, verification, or other 
normative epistemological standards, compared to factual beliefs. Interestingly, believers who 
were highly certain these propositions were true were willing to report their lack of verifiability.  
 Hypothesis 3B was supported. Those who scored more highly on the NIRO scale were 
less likely to say that verification is the best way to justify beliefs. This finding suggests that 
high-religiosity individuals do not view verification as the only or best path to determining what 
is true (at least explicitly). It could be that higher religiosity individuals adopt alternative sources 
of knowledge such as revelation, faith, or the testimony of others, and therefore come to think of 
verification as relatively less valuable.  
 Hypothesis 3C was supported. Participants, overall, value verification as a means of 
determining what is true. Participants responded with an average agreement rating of 69.61 (on a 
scale from 0 to 100) that, “In order to know a statement is true, it must be theoretically possible 
to prove it to be true.” This indicates that people do feel verification is a necessary component of 
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justification. In addition, participants, on average, valued observable evidence in the world as the 
best proof that a statement is true, responding with an average agreement rating of 76.03. This 
finding indicates that people use evidentialism and observable states of the world in the process 
of determining what is true. 
 In sum, more participants responded that facts were verifiable than said political and 
religious beliefs were verifiable, but higher religiosity and right-wing individuals viewed 
verification as less important for obtaining knowledge.  
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Chapter 5: Study 4 – Falsification 
 The purpose of Study 4 was to investigate the epistemological concept of falsification in 
laypeople. Do laypeople think falsification is important when determining what is true? Do they 
think their own beliefs are theoretically falsifiable?  
 Study 4 sought to demonstrate that laypeople find factual beliefs most falsifiable 
followed by political followed by religious beliefs, which are the least falsifiable. This prediction 
was based on the idea that political and religious beliefs are less likely to depend on any state of 
the world or be justifiable through evidence. In Study 3, a prediction was that laypeople hold 
verification to be an important component of justification (the process for establishing what is 
true). In Study 4, however, it was predicted that laypeople would value falsification less than 
verification. This was predicted because attempting to prove a proposition is false in order to 
support its truth could be counterintuitive and less useful to laypeople than verification. In 
addition, previous research on the confirmation bias has shown that people often seek to verify 
their hypotheses more than they seek to falsify them (Nickerson, 1998).  
 Another prediction in Study 4 was that highly religious individuals would value 
falsification less as a means of determining truth compared to less religious individuals. This 
prediction was based on the idea that a religious worldview involves methods for determining 
truth, including revelation and faith, which do not depend on or relate to states of the world. 
Truth depending on falsifiability conflicts with the religious worldview. In addition, pondering 
conditions that would render one’s religious or political beliefs false has been shown to cause 
negative affect (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000), and therefore it is possible that 
highly religious individuals would avoid falsification or think of it as less useful.  
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5.1 Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 4A: Facts will be said to be theoretically falsifiable most frequently, followed 
by political and then religious statements.   
 Hypotheses 4B: People will on average, respond that falsifiability is necessary in order to 
know a statement is true. However, the mean response will be lower than the mean response 
from Study 3 regarding whether verifiability is necessary in order to know a statement is true.  
Participants will, on average, value evidence in the world as the best proof that a proposition is 
false.  
 Hypothesis 4C: There will be a negative correlation between scores on the NIRO scale 
and responses to questions 2 and 3 (i.e., whether falsifiability is necessary for knowing a 
proposition is true and whether observable evidence in the world is the best proof that a 
proposition is false). 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
 154 Americans (105 males) over the age 18 (mean age = 40.2 years old), recruited from 
MTurk, participated in the study.  
5.2.2 Procedure and Measures 
 Part 1 of Study 4 was identical to that of Study 3. The structure of Part 2 was identical to 
that of Study 3, except that the questions in Part 2 were different in order to test laypeople’s 
views of falsification rather than verification. In Part 2, participants were presented with the 
following instructions after each statement:   
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 “Some statements can be proven to be false while others cannot. Please note, this is not 
the same as whether a statement actually is false or not. 
 In Part 2, we are not interested in whether you think a statement is false or not. We are 
only interested in whether you think it is possible to prove the statement to be false. To help 
understand what we mean, please consider examples in the table below.    
Statement Conditions that would prove it to be false Possible to prove false? 
All swans are white You see a black swan Yes 
The moon is made of 
cheese 
Astronauts travel to the moon and find it is not 
made of cheese. Yes 
Barack Obama is the 
president 
 You learn that everyone has tricked you and 
Barack Obama is not the president. He is actually 
an actor who was hired to play the president as 
part of the trick. (Note: In reality, Barack Obama 
is the president but it is at least theoretically 
possible to prove this statement to be false.) 
Yes 
  There is a species of fish 
with an amazing type of 
camouflage. The fish is so 
camouflaged that it cannot 
be detected by anything. 
In order to prove this statement is false, it would 
be necessary to prove that there is no such fish. 
But the fish can avoid all detection so it's 
theoretically impossible to prove it's not there. 
No 
 
 Consider the following statement from Part 1: 
 [A statement from Part 1 appeared here.]   
 Question 1: Do you think it is theoretically possible to prove that this statement is false?” 
 After completing Part 2, participants then were asked to answer the following two 
additional questions, and responded to each using a slider that ranged from 0 – “Totally 
disagree” to 100 – “Totally agree”: 
 Question 2:  “To what extent do you agree with the following statement: In order to know 
a statement is true, it must be theoretically possible to prove it to be false.”  
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 Question 3: “To what extent do you agree with the following statement: The best proof 
that a statement is false is evidence that you can observe in the world.”  
5.3 Results 
 In Part 1 of the study, some participants did not indicate that they were highly certain that 
any statement was true for at least one of the three domains. It was preferable to have at least one 
data point for each participant for each domain, so these participants were excluded from the 
analyses, leaving a remaining 96 participants (71 males).  
 Participants responded with a yes/no response as to whether a statement was falsifiable or 
not. Significantly fewer participants responded that religious statements were falsifiable. 
Interestingly, political statements were classified as falsifiable by a slightly greater percentage of 
participants than were factual statements (see Fig. 4). A chi-square analysis revealed that 
differences were statistically significant across domains, chi square = 65.24, df = 2, p < .0001. 
All comparisons were significantly different: Political vs. religious chi square = 61.34, df = 1, p 
< .0001; political vs. factual chi square =7.21, df = 1, p = .007; factual vs. religious chi square 
=31.46, df = 1, p < .0001). 
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Figure 4: Frequency of “yes” responses to falsification question 
  
 Mean slider responses and standard errors for questions 2 and 3 are given in Table 5.  
Table 5. Mean slider responses (SE) to questions 2 and 3 
Question 2 and 3: To what extent do you agree with the following 
statement? 
Mean Response (SE) 
In order to know a statement is true, it must be theoretically possible 
to prove it to be false. 
58.53 (3.66) 
The best proof that a statement is false is evidence that people can 
observe in the world. 
69.77 (2.99) 
 
 Scores on the NIRO were not significantly correlated with the slider responses on 
question 2, but there was a negative correlation with responses to question 3. The correlation 
between NIRO score and question 2 was -.04 (p = .66) and between NIRO score and question 3 
was -.27 (p = .01). 
 To check for effects of religiosity and political orientation on responses to question 1, the 
average number of “yes” responses was calculated for religious statements and for political 
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statements. Then a correlation was calculated between the NIRO score and average number of 
“yes” responses to religious statements. There was no significant correlation, r = .19, p = .07. 
There also was no significant correlation found between RWA scores and average number of 
“yes” responses to question 1 with respect to political statements, r = -.06, p = .53. 
5.4 Study 4 Discussion 
 Hypothesis 4A was partially supported. The primary finding was that, as predicted, a 
significantly larger percentage of participants responded that religious statements were 
unfalsifiable compared to factual or political statements. It is to be noted that factual statements 
were said to be falsifiable less frequently than were political statements. It is possible that the 
participants could not imagine a realistic way to falsify an obviously true fact. For example, what 
would be required to falsify a statement like, “Coca Cola is a brand of soda?” Only a massive 
conspiracy involving the entire population of the world could be the answer. So even though 
such a statement is theoretically falsifiable, it may have been difficult for participants to imagine 
a set of circumstances in which falsification could occur. A number of participants may have 
responded that obviously true facts were unfalsifiable, thereby misunderstanding the theoretical 
possibility of falsification. This potential misunderstanding does not diminish the validity of the 
data with respect to religious statements. The instructions asked participants if they could 
imagine a set of circumstances in which the statement could be false. Even if participants were 
unable to correctly apply the idea of theoretical falsifiability to factual statements, the finding 
that participants could not imagine a set of circumstances that would cause their religious beliefs 
to be false still reveals an interesting difference in how people think about religious versus 
factual beliefs.  
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 Hypothesis 4B was supported. Participants responded with an average agreement rating 
of 58.53 (on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, with 50 representing moderately in agreement), that, 
“In order to know a statement is true, it must be theoretically possible to prove it to be false.” 
This indicates that people do value falsification but less so than verification, which scored an 
average agreement rating of 69.61 that, “In order to know a statement is true, it must be 
theoretically possible to prove it to be true.” However, participants on average valued evidence 
in the world as the best proof that a statement is false, responding with an average agreement 
rating of 69.77. This finding indicates that people on average use evidentialism and observable 
states of the world in the process of determining what is false.  
 Hypothesis 4C was not supported. There was not the predicted negative correlation 
between degree of religiosity as measured by scores on the NIRO and valuing falsifiability 
(question 2), although there was a negative correlation between the NIRO scores and valuing 
observable evidence in the world (question 3). Hypothesis 4C was based on the idea that a 
religious worldview depends less on evidentialism and that attempting to falsify religious beliefs 
might cause negative affect (Tetlock et al., 2000). It is still possible that these influences 
diminish the extent to which one values falsification as an epistemological tool.  
 The concept of falsification may well have been counterintuitive to many of the 
participants. If one were unfamiliar with falsification, it is possible that a proposition would 
appear less true if it could theoretically be proven false. In the instructions, participants were 
educated about the meaning of falsification and provided with several examples. However, they 
were not instructed about exactly how to value falsification or why it functions well in advancing 
true hypotheses. It seems likely that the distribution of responses to questions 2 and 3 was 
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primarily influenced by an understanding of falsification (those who understood falsification 
more valued it more), more than it was influenced by religiosity level. The failure to find a 
significant negative correlation does not call into question the validity of the other findings nor 
does it rule out the possibility that religiosity does negatively correlate with valuing falsification 
under circumstances in which the role of falsification is well understood by the participants. 
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Chapter 6: Study 5 – Theories of Truth 
 The purpose of Study 5 was to investigate three theories of truth from academic 
epistemology in laypeople: correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic. Study 5 also explored the 
extent to which people rely on two sources of knowledge: testimony of others and faith. 
Specifically, Study 5 asked which of these theories of truth laypeople intuitively understand and 
use when asked to define why a proposition is true, and whether there would be differences 
depending on the domain. How do testimony of others and faith serve as sources of knowledge 
across domains?  
 Study 5 made several predictions. It was predicted that laypeople would report that their 
religious and political beliefs correspond to the world less, and cohere with other true 
propositions less than factual beliefs do. These predictions were based on two ideas. One is that 
many religious and political propositions do not accurately describe any state of the world and 
are inconsistent with other true propositions. As a consequence, these propositions cannot be true 
by virtue of correspondence or coherence. For example, consider the statement, “Noah put all 
animal species onto an ark to save them from a flood.” Such a statement refers to the world. 
However, nothing in the world convincingly corroborates it. There is nothing in the world that 
suggests such an ark or flood existed. True propositions about animal species also conflict with 
such a claim. It would be impossible for an ark to house millions of animal species, each 
requiring complex habitats, resources, and so on. Neither correspondence nor coherence can 
function as defining properties of truth.  
 The second idea inspiring this prediction is that people do not want their religious and 
political beliefs to be held hostage by correspondence or coherence. In other words, the idea that 
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religious and political propositions could be proven to be false based on a lack of correspondence 
or coherence is unacceptable to believers, and therefore these properties must not define why 
these propositions are true.  
 It also was predicted in Study 5 that people would be more likely to endorse the 
pragmatic theory for defining the truth of religious and political propositions more than factual 
propositions. Consequences and functionality of belief are used in the religious and political 
domains more than in the factual domain as a defining property of truth. A lay version of the 
pragmatic theory was investigated in Study 5 where the function of truth is tied to the good of 
society. For example, “When everyone believes in God, society works better.”  
 It was predicted that laypeople would say that the testimony of others is more a source of 
knowledge in the religious and political domains compared to the factual domain. The 
explanation for this prediction is that people often adopt religious and political ideas from their 
ingroup as opposed to acquiring them from observation. For example, the evidence surrounding 
a political issue like climate change is inaccessible to laypeople, yet many report to be extremely 
certain about whether humans are causing global warming. Many religious and political 
propositions are acquired at a young age without any opportunity for critical analysis. In order to 
explore how laypeople rely on testimony across domains, Study 5 included one question about 
reliance on trust in others and one about the importance of acquiring the belief before 25 years of 
age.  
 Finally, Study 5 explored the idea of faith by asking people if their beliefs need to be 
justified in order to be true. The prediction was that participants would say religious beliefs 
require the least justification followed by political and then factual. The rationale for this 
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prediction was that religious believers rely on faith as a source of knowledge rather than 
justification. In addition, both religious and political believers might not want the truth of their 
beliefs to depend on justification, preferring for it to be outside the reach of any process that 
could prove it to be false.  
6.1 Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 5A: When determining a statement to be true, participants will use 
correspondence theory mostly for factual statements, followed by political followed by religious 
statements.  
 Hypothesis 5B: When determining a statement to be true, participants will use coherence 
theory mostly for factual statements, followed by political followed by religious statements. 
Hypothesis 5C: When determining a statement to be true, participants will use the 
pragmatic theory (a lay version of it) mostly for religious/political statements, and less for factual 
statements.  
 Hypothesis 5D: When determining a statement to be true, participants will rely on 
trusting others most for religious statements, followed by political followed by factual 
statements. 
 Hypothesis 5E: Participants will report that religious statements would be least likely to 
be believed if encountered after the age of 25, followed by political, followed by factual 
statements.  
 Hypothesis 5F: Participants will report that they need justification the least to know 
religious statements are true, followed by political, followed factual statements. 
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6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
 152 American participants (97 male) over the age of 18 (mean age 37.11), recruited from 
MTurk, participated in the study.  
6.2.2 Procedure and Measures 
 Study 5 investigated people’s theory of truth/justification (i.e., why/how do you think this 
statement is true?) across the three domains. Three well-known, philosophical theories of truth 
were tested: correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic. Two additional bases for truth were 
tested: faith (which was tested by asking participants how much they need to justify a statement 
in order to believe it), and trust in other people/indoctrination (meant to investigate how 
laypeople use the testimony of others).  
 Participants completed Part 1, just as in the previous studies. In Part 2, along with each 
statement, participants were presented with the following questions in random order. 
Correspondence 
 “People have different reasons for believing what is true. Sometimes, people believe that 
a statement is true because specific events or circumstances in the world make the statement true. 
So, a person might say: “I believe this statement is true because of these circumstances or events 
in the world. If these circumstances or events were different, then the statement might not be 
true.” 
 However, sometimes people believe that a statement is true independent of any 
circumstances or events in the world. So, a person might say: “I believe this statement is true 
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independent of circumstances or events in the world. Even if the world were different, I would 
still believe this statement is true.”  
 In Part 1 you indicated that you were highly certain that the statement below is true. Do 
you believe that the statement below is true because of circumstances or events in the world, or 
independent of circumstances or events in the world? 
 [A statement from Part 1 appeared here].  
 Question 1: Why do you believe this statement is true?” [Participants saw a slider labeled 
0, “Completely because of circumstances or events in the world” to 100, “Completely 
independent of circumstances or events in the world”]. 
Coherence 
 “Some people think that in order for a statement to be true it must be consistent with all 
other information that we already know is true. According to this perspective, all true statements 
fit together like pieces of a big puzzle. Each piece of the puzzle is connected to other pieces. If a 
statement does not fit into the puzzle, then it is not consistent with other true statements and 
cannot be true.  
 Alternatively, some people think that it is possible for statements to be true that are not 
consistent with one another. According to this perspective, statements can be true even if they do 
not fit with other true statements.  
 In Part 1 you indicated that you were highly certain that the statement below is true. We 
are interested in which perspective best describes why you feel the statement below is true. 
Using the slider below, please indicate how consistent you think the statement below is with 
everything else in the world that is true. 
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 [A statement from Part 1 appeared here].  
 Question 2: How consistent is this statement with everything you know is true in the 
world?” [Participants saw a slider from 0, “Completely inconsistent with everything that is true” 
to 100, “Completely consistent with everything that is true”]. 
Pragmatic 
 “Some people think that a statement can be true because when everyone believes the 
statement is true, society works better. For example, some people think that the statement 
“voting in large elections is a good use of one’s time” is a true statement because if everyone 
believes that voting is a good use of time, then democracy functions well. 
 In Part 1 you indicated that you were highly certain that the statement below is true. To 
what extent do you think the statement below is true because when everyone believes this 
statement is true, there is a positive effect on society? 
 [A statement from Part 1 appeared here].  
 Question 3: To what extent do you think this statement is true because when everyone 
believes this statement is true, there is a positive effect on society?” [Participants saw a slider 
labeled 0, “A positive effect on society has nothing to do with why this statement is true” to 100, 
“A positive effect on society has a lot to do with why this statement is true”]. 
Testimony 
 “Sometimes, in order to believe a statement is true, we need to trust what someone else 
told us. For example, if your friend tells you that someone has been saying mean things about 
you behind your back, then you’ll probably believe your friend because you trust your friend. 
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However, sometimes we believe what people tell us without needing to trust them. For example, 
when you ask a complete stranger what time it is, the stranger looks at their watch and then tells 
you the time. You believe the stranger, but there is almost no trust required to believe the 
stranger.  
 In Part 1 you indicated that you were highly certain that the statement below is true. How 
much trust in other people is required in order to believe this statement is true?  
 [A statement from Part 1 appeared here].  
 Question 4: How much trust in other people is required in order to believe this statement 
is true? [Participants saw a slider labeled 0, ‘No trust required’ to 100, ‘High level of trust 
required’]. 
 Question 5: Imagine that a person grew up in a place where there was no information 
available about the statement below. This person never received any information about the 
statement below, before the age of 25. Then, at the age of 25, this person learned information 
relevant to the statement below. How likely do you think it is that this 25-year-old person would 
believe the statement below is true?” 
 [A statement from Part 1 appeared here].  
 [Participants saw a slider labeled 0, “Extremely unlikely” to 100, “Extremely likely”]. 
Justification vs. Faith 
 “People have different reasons for believing what is true. Sometimes, people believe that 
a statement is true because they believe that they can justify that the statement is true. According 
to this perspective, if the statement cannot be justified, then it is not true.  
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In contrast, sometimes people believe that a statement is true without needing to believe that they 
can justify that the statement is true. According to this perspective, even if the person cannot 
justify that the statement is true, the person still believes the statement is true.  
 In Part 1 you indicated that you were highly certain that the statement below is true. To 
what extent do you need justification in order to believe the statement below is true? 
 [A statement from Part 1 appeared here].  
 Question 6: To what extent do you need justification in order to believe the statement is 
true?” [Participants saw a slider labeled 0, “Completely do not need justification” to 100, 
“Completely need justification”]. 
6.3 Results 
 In Part 1 of the study, some participants did not indicate that they were highly certain that 
any statement was true for at least one domain. It was preferable to have at least one data point 
for each participant for each domain, so these participants were excluded from the analyses 
leaving a remaining 98 participants (63 males). 
 Participants could see the same question up to two times per domain (for up to two 
statements per domain). For all the questions with sliders, the mean response was calculated for 
each question, each participant, and each domain. To compare across domains, these mean 
response values were entered into repeated measures ANOVAs. The independent variable for 
each ANOVA was the domain, and the dependent variable was the mean slider response (see 
Table 6 for means and ANOVA results). 
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Table 6. Theories of truth/justification, mean slider responses, and p values from ANOVA tests – 
Study 5 
    p values from comparisons 
Question Political 
Mean 
(SE) 
Religious 
Mean 
(SE) 
Factual 
Mean 
(SE) 
F 
 
Political 
vs. 
Religious 
Political 
vs. 
Factual 
Religious 
vs. 
Factual 
Correspondence 21.68 
(2.24) 
57.60 
(3.47) 
56.34 
(3.79) 
71.74 *** *** 1 
Coherence 75.72 
(2.32) 
72.03 
(2.78) 
85.55 
(2.26) 
12.54 0.71 ** *** 
Pragmatic 61.97 
(3.14) 
39.77 
(3.50) 
26.92 
(3.18) 
40.27 *** ** *** 
Trust 48.76 
(3.15) 
43.18 
(3.77) 
23.63 
(2.84) 
26.61 0.606 *** *** 
Indoctrination 63.24 
(2.62) 
62.1 
(2.96) 
81.64 
(2.51) 
21.78 1 *** *** 
Justification 56.03 
(3.16) 
38.85 
(3.53) 
33.09 
(3.54) 
15.81 *** *** 0.616 
Note. The question column displays a summary of the question or prompt that the participants 
saw. The political mean, religious mean, and factual mean columns show the means of the mean 
slider responses to each question for each domain. df for all ANOVAS were (2, 96). * p <.05; ** 
p <.01; *** p <.001. 
 
6.4 Study 5 Discussion 
 Hypothesis 5A was not supported. Participants responded that they relied on 
correspondence mostly for political truth followed by factual/religious. This result unfortunately 
does not offer concrete evidence for an alternative explanation. However, one suggestion is that 
laypeople do not think about correspondence when defining why their beliefs are true. As 
discussed above, the concept of correspondence can seem too obvious such that it’s circular and 
confusing, especially to laypeople. The abstruse nature of correspondence might preclude its 
intuitive functionality in laypeople. Given the results of Study 3, however, it seems likely that 
some lay version of correspondence is used for all kinds of observable, verifiable facts. 
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 However, explicit access to this epistemological principle may be limited.  To explain 
why political statements received the highest ratings, one guess is that participants focused on 
the mention of “events or circumstances in the world,” in the instructions. Philosophers often 
refer to the “world” as meaning simply everything in existence, and “events” as meaning 
anything that occurs. But it is possible that participants associated the “world” with locations 
outside the U.S., as in “world news,” and “events” with something like “current events,” which 
are often political. This putative confusion about the meaning of these terms then would be a 
reason for why they responded that “events in the world” were the basis for their political beliefs, 
but less so for their religious or factual beliefs.  
 Hypothesis 5B was supported: Participants responded that their factual beliefs cohere 
with other truths more than religious/political beliefs. It was possible that people might represent 
exceptions to rules as a way of avoiding inconsistency. For example, consider the statement, 
“Jesus walked on water without sinking.” A believer could say, “Walking on water is impossible 
but because Jesus was divine, he was able to do it.” By making this type of exception, a believer 
could therefore reason that all of these propositions cohere perfectly. But it appears that instead, 
laypeople think of religious/political beliefs as being less consistent than factual beliefs with 
other knowledge.  
 Hypothesis 5C was supported. Philosophers who consider themselves pragmatists define 
a proposition to be true when it functions best for a particular purpose (e.g., propositions about 
the nature of a medication are true if the medication cures disease). In Study 5, a lay version of 
the pragmatic theory was tested in which participants were asked if their belief is true because 
when people believe it is true then society works better. Participants attributed their belief that 
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both religious and political statements were true to this version of pragmatism, more than they 
did for factual beliefs. The effect was greatest for the political domain. This finding does not 
present a problem for the interpretation of the results, but a difference between religious and 
political domains was not predicted. It may be that the word “society” and the example of voting 
in elections in the instructions caused participants to think about political repercussions the most, 
even though the question did not intend to have participants focus on the political consequences 
of belief.  
 In academic epistemology, philosophers often are interested in the extent to which we can 
rely on the testimony of others as a source of knowledge. Questions 4 and 5 were designed to test 
the extent to which trust in authority and indoctrination are the sources for belief in the political, 
religious, and factual domains. Hypothesis 5D was supported. Participants responded that they 
rely more on trust in what others told them, in order to believe political and religious statements, 
compared to factual statements. Hypothesis 5E also was supported. Participants responded that 
the likelihood of belief, if the relevant information was only discovered after the age of 25, 
would be lower for political and religious statements compared to factual statements. Both of 
these findings are consistent with the idea that people are more likely to have acquired their 
political and religious beliefs from others, particularly at a young age, as opposed to having 
acquired them from observation, verification, and evidentialism.  
Hypothesis 5F was not supported. Participants responded that they needed to justify 
political statements the most followed by religious/factual, which were not significantly different 
from each other. Question 6 was intended to test how participants use justification for their 
beliefs in the political, religious, and factual domains. The predicted result was that participants 
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would say that religious statements needed less justification because they can be known through 
faith. But this prediction, surprisingly, was not confirmed. By asking participants if their beliefs 
“need” to be justified in order to be true, question 6 was supposed to cause participants to reflect 
on which types of beliefs can be true without justification. While it cannot be known for sure, 
one possible explanation is that phrasing the question this way may have caused participants to 
think about when they felt they “needed” to justify these beliefs to other people in real-life 
conversations. Under this interpretation, participants may have envisioned a political debate as 
the only instance in which they would likely need to produce justification for their beliefs. 
Furthermore, it may have sounded strange to think about “needing” to justify an obvious fact like 
“Coca Cola is a brand of soda,” for example. 
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Chapter 7: Study 6 – Objectivity 
 Study 6 investigated the concept of objectivity. Similar to previous studies (Goodwin & 
Darley, 2008, 2012), Study 6 looked at the extent to which people feel that their beliefs are 
objectively versus subjectively true across different domains. When people feel their belief is 
objectively true, that means it is true for everyone, and anyone who disagrees with them is 
mistaken. Alternatively, when someone feels their belief is subjectively true, that means it is true 
for them, and yet it is possible for others to hold opposing, subjectively true beliefs. Therefore, if 
someone disagrees, then that person may not necessarily be mistaken. A third dimension, 
nihilism also was explored. If a believer is nihilistic about a proposition, then she doesn’t think it 
is possible to say whose perspective is correct in the event of a disagreement. The proposition is 
not objectively true for everyone nor is it subjectively true for each individual. 
 It was predicted that participants would find factual statements to be the most objectively 
true, followed by religious/political statements. This was predicted because factual propositions 
are based most clearly on universal, normative, epistemological standards. It also was predicted 
that participants would be most nihilistic about religious statements followed by political and 
then factual statements. This was predicted because religious propositions violate normative 
epistemological standards the most and therefore, in the case of a disagreement, establishing who 
is correct is very difficult or impossible.  
 Study 6 also explored tolerance of disagreement. How do people feel about those who 
disagree with them across the three domains? Disagreement was used as a window into how 
people think about the nature of their own beliefs. For example, it was predicted that people 
would rate those who disagreed about facts as lower on intelligence and reasonableness 
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compared to those who disagreed about political and religious statements. The rationale behind 
this prediction was that people feel that belief in facts depends on an intelligent, reasonable 
appreciation of reality whereas belief in political or religious propositions does not. Laypeople 
understand that political and religious propositions are not based on universal, objectively true 
pieces of evidence, but rather on other influences (for example, one’s group affiliation). 
Therefore, holding an opposing political or religious belief wouldn’t say anything about one’s 
intelligence or reasonableness. 
 Conversely, it was predicted that holding an opposing political or religious view would 
signal an immoral nature, whereas holding an opposing factual view would signal nothing about 
a person’s morality. Because opposing religious and political views signal one’s outgroup 
affiliation, and because people denigrate outgroup members, it was predicted that participants 
would rate political and religious opponents as lower on moral qualities and as less desirable to 
interact with socially. 
7.1 Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 6A: Participants will select choice A, that the person who disagrees with them 
is mistaken, more often when responding to factual statements and less when responding to 
political/religious statements. Choice B, that neither person is mistaken in the case of 
disagreement, will be selected most for political statements followed by religious and then 
factual statements. Choice C, that it is impossible to say who is right in the case of a 
disagreement, will be selected most frequently in response to religious statements, followed by 
political and then factual statements.  
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 Hypothesis 6B: Participants will rate those who disagree with factual statements lower on 
intelligence and reasonableness, followed by those who disagree on political and then religious 
statements. Participants will rate those who disagree on political/religious statements lower on 
moral qualities like goodness, fairness, honesty, and kindness, but higher on dogmatism, 
compared to those who disagree on factual statements.  
 Hypothesis 6C: Participants will be more opposed to being friends with, dating, and 
being roommates with political and religious opponents than with factual opponents. 
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Participants 
 161 Americans (106 males) over the age of 18 (mean age = 41.25 years old), recruited 
from MTurk workers, completed the study. 
7.2.2 Procedure and Measures 
 After completing Part 1, participants were presented with the following instructions along 
with each of the statements selected from Part 1. The statements were presented in random order, 
but for each statement, participants first saw the objectivism versus subjectivism question and 
next saw the tolerance questions (as they are written below).  
 Objectivism versus subjectivism.  
 Question 1: “Please read the following statement. Then answer the question below about 
this statement. 
 [A statement from Part 1 appeared here].  
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 Your previous response indicated that you are highly certain that the statement above is 
true. Imagine someone who disagrees with you about the statement above. This person thinks the 
statement above is definitely false. Please choose the option that most closely represents how 
you feel about the disagreement between you and this person:  
A) The person who disagrees with me is mistaken.  
B) Neither one of us is mistaken, we could both be correct.  
C) It is impossible to say who is right or wrong.”   
 Choice A was meant to capture objectivism/absolutism. Choice B was meant to capture 
subjectivism/relativism. Choice C was meant to capture something like a lay version of nihilism. 
 Tolerance versus intolerance.  
 “Please read the following statement. Then answer the questions below about this 
statement. 
 [A statement from Part 1 appeared here].   
 Your previous response indicated that you are highly certain that the statement above is 
true. Imagine someone who disagrees with you about the statement above. This person thinks the 
statement above is definitely false.  
 Question 2: Think about the person who thinks the statement above is false. What kind of 
person do you imagine he/she is? Please rate this person on the following traits. [Participants saw 
separate sliders for intelligent, morally good, fair, honest, dogmatic, reasonable, kind]. 
 Think about the person who thinks the statement above is false. How opposed would you 
be to each of the following? 
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 Question 3: How opposed would you be to being friends with this person?” [Participants 
saw a slider from 0, ‘Not opposed at all’ to 100, ‘Extremely opposed.’] 
 Question 4: How opposed would you be to dating this person? [Participants saw a slider 
from 0, ‘Not opposed at all’ to 100, ‘Extremely opposed.’] 
 Question 5: How opposed would you be to being roommates with this person?” 
[Participants saw a slider from 0, “Not opposed at all” to 100, “Extremely opposed.”]  
7.3 Results 
 In Part 1 of the study, some participants did not indicate that they were highly certain that 
any statement was true for at least one domain. It was preferable to have at least one data point 
for each participant for each domain, so these participants were excluded from the analyses, 
leaving 104 participants (74 males). 
 For question 1, participants were most objective about factual statements (as predicted), 
followed by religious followed by political statements. As may be seen in Figure 5, participants 
were most subjective about political statements followed by religious followed by factual, and 
most nihilistic about religious statements followed by political followed by factual statements. 
Results from a chi-square test of independence revealed a significant difference among domains 
(chi square = 90.361, df = 4, p < .0001). All pairwise comparisons were significantly different: 
Political vs. religious chi square =15.73, df = 2, p < .001; political vs. factual chi square = 60.80, 
df = 2, p < .0001; factual vs. religious chi square = 60.03, df = 2, p < .0001). 
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Figure 5: Responses to objectivity question 
 
 Just as in the previous studies, the responses to the slider questions were averaged and the 
mean responses were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA in which the independent 
variable was the domain and the dependent variable was the slider responses. (For results of the 
ANOVA tests see Table 7.) 
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Table 7. Questions and results from ANOVA tests – Study 6 
    p values from comparisons 
Question Political 
Mean 
 (SE) 
Religious 
Mean  
(SE) 
Factual 
Mean 
(SE) 
F 
 
Political 
vs. 
Religious 
Political 
vs. 
Factual 
Religious 
vs. 
Factual 
How intelligent is this person?  42.73 
(2.41) 
43.18 
(2.73) 
18.79 
(2.21) 
43.79 1 *** *** 
How morally good is this 
person? 
45.33 
(2.45) 
49.47 
(2.40) 
50.64 
(2) 
3.15 .181 .067 1 
How fair is this person? 44.56 
(2.40) 
48.74 
(2.26) 
45.39 
(1.93) 
2.17 .145 1 .461 
How honest is this person? 52.24 
(2.38) 
52.96 
(2.53) 
45.07 
(2.24) 
5.99 1 ** **  
How dogmatic is this person? 56.72 
(2.28) 
59.50 
(2.69) 
52.41 
(2.22) 
3.45 .753 .154 * 
How reasonable is this person? 39.59 
(2.18) 
41.54 
(2.52) 
27.34 
(2.40) 
14.85 1 *** *** 
How kind is this person? 48.35 
(2.46) 
52.64 
(2.03) 
50.61 
(1.92) 
2.17 .119 .934 .940 
How opposed would you be to 
being friends with this person? 
31.75 
(3.20) 
29.92 
(3.10) 
40.42 
(3.32) 
4.68 1 * * 
How opposed would you be to 
dating is this person? 
50.34 
(3.60) 
56.90 
(3.49) 
58.56 
(3.65) 
3.29 .149 .076 1 
How opposed would you be to 
being roommates with this 
person? 
39.89 
(3.48) 
39.15 
(3.66) 
47.58 
(3.36) 
2.71 1 .099 .115 
Note. The question column displays a summary of the question or prompt that the participants 
saw. The political mean, religious mean, and factual mean columns show the means of the mean 
slider responses to each question for each domain. df for all ANOVAS were (2, 112). * p <.05; ** p 
<.01; *** p <.001. 
 
7.4 Study 6 Discussion 
 Hypothesis 6A was supported. The largest percentage of participants responded that 
factual statements were objectively true, followed by religious followed by political statements. 
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The reverse pattern was true for which statements were most subjective. The greatest percentage 
of nihilistic responses corresponded to religious statements, followed by political followed by 
factual statements, as predicted.  
 Hypotheses 6Band 6C were mostly unsupported. As predicted, participants responded 
that those who disagreed with them about factual statements were less intelligent and less 
reasonable compared to those who disagreed about political or religious statements. This finding 
supports the argument that people do not think of religious and political truth as normative, 
reasonable, or the result of intelligent comprehension of reality. 
 Responses about an opponent’s goodness, fairness, or kindness, however, showed no 
significant differences across domains. Interestingly, participants responded that someone who 
disagreed about factual statements was less honest, possibly because they thought anyone who 
said obviously true facts were false would have to be lying. In addition, the responses to the 
questions about being friends, dating, or being roommates were also not as predicted. The only 
significant difference was that participants said they would want to be friends least with someone 
who disagreed about facts – again probably because participants figured someone who thought 
obviously true facts were false would have to be lying or somehow impaired.  
 One possibility for this pattern of findings is that people view intolerance as immoral. 
Judging an outgroup member poorly or refusing to socialize with them could be viewed as a 
form of bigotry in oneself. The entire set of predictions revolved around people’s propensity to 
denigrate the outgroup. This manipulation either failed to provoke a negative reaction towards 
the outgroup, or participants did not want to reveal prejudiced feelings towards others. 
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Chapter 8: Study 7 – Features of Uncertainty  
 Study 7 explored beyond academic principles to investigate more intuitive ideas related 
to knowledge. Several concepts were chosen for investigation. These concepts were chosen to 
illuminate different dimensions of overall certainty and nature of belief. In Part 2 of Study 7, 
participants were asked to consider the religious, political, and factual statements that they had 
indicated were certainly true in Part 1. Participants were asked how much effort was required to 
believe that the statement was true, how obvious that truth was, how reasonable belief was, how 
frequently they doubted the truth of the statement, and whether they would say they “believed” 
versus “knew” the statement was true. Each of these questions captured a different intuitive piece 
of overall certainty and belief. By asking about certainty indirectly, the design aimed to more 
accurately assess participants’ intuitions.  
 In Study 7, people also were asked to think about another person who disagreed with 
them. Rather than report how they tolerated this other person (as was done in Study 6), 
participants were asked to report how they would feel listening to counterarguments against their 
religious, political, and factual beliefs. Asking participants to react to counterarguments was yet 
another, indirect method of revealing their intuitions about their own beliefs. Participants also 
were asked to evaluate the qualities of the counterarguments and say whether they would avoid 
listening to them.  
 It was predicted that participants would report that religious and political statements 
required more effort to believe, were less obviously true, and were less reasonable to believe 
than factual statements. It was predicted that participants would report that they doubted 
religious and political beliefs more often than factual ones, and that they “believed” religious and 
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political statements, and “knew” factual statements were true. The rationale for these predictions 
was that people are less certain that religious/political propositions are true compared to factual 
ones, at least in the sense that “true” equates to tracking reality. To the extent that “true” means 
something else (e.g., signaling group membership or signaling features about oneself), Study 7 
did not offer any evidence. “Believe” and “know” were assumed to have slightly different 
meanings to participants. Both words refer to accepting that a proposition is true. However, 
“believe” allows for more subjectivity (as in a “personal belief”) and depends less on an 
objective representation of reality. “Know,” conversely, has more of an objective, universally 
true connotation that refers to tracking reality based on normative standards.  
 When asked how they would feel listening to counterarguments, it was predicted that 
participants would be more likely to experience negative emotions (anger, offense, disgust, and 
guilt) in reaction to religious/political counterarguments whereas they would be more likely to 
feel confusion and surprise towards factual counterarguments. The rationale for this prediction 
was that negative emotions occur when one feels their political/religious identify is threatened by 
a counterargument. Negative emotions do not make sense if one finds the counterarguments to 
be obviously untrue. Surprise and confusion, however, make sense when one finds the content of 
the counterarguments to be obviously untrue. As a control, participants were asked about some 
additional emotional states, such as happiness and fear. It was predicted that there would be no 
difference in happiness and fear levels across domains.  
 It was predicted that participants would find religious/political counterarguments more 
valuable, more predictable, more logical, and would avoid them more than factual 
counterarguments. The rationale here was that people are aware that their religious and political 
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beliefs do not always track reality and can be exposed as untrue by well-reasoned 
counterarguments. For example, if one believes that Jesus' mother, Mary, was a virgin when she 
gave birth to Jesus, one might accept that counterarguments would be logical, predictable, and 
reasonable. Avoiding these counterarguments could be a way to minimize the negative 
experience of confronting conflicting representations of truth.  
 The overall goal of Study 7 was to provide a window into the nature of certainty of truth 
from several different angles. If all of the different dimensions of belief showed the predicted 
domain differences in Study 7, it would offer strong support for the view that people do not think 
political and religious propositions as tracking reality the same way they think factual 
propositions do. 
8.1 Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 7A: Participants will report that factual statements are the most obviously 
true, followed by political, followed by religious statements.  
 Hypothesis 7B: Participants will be most certain that a reasonable other person would 
agree with them about the truth of factual statements, followed by political, followed by religious 
statements.  
 Hypothesis 7C: Participants will respond that religious statements require the most effort, 
commitment, and dedication to believe, followed by political, followed by factual statements. 
 Hypothesis 7D: Participants will say they have doubted religious beliefs the most, 
followed by political, followed by factual.  
 Hypothesis 7E: A greater percentage of participants will respond that they “believe” 
religious statements compared to political statements, and the lowest percentage will respond 
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that they “believe” factual statements. The pattern for “knowing” statements are true will be the 
reverse.  
 Hypothesis 7F: Participants will be more angry, mad, offended, guilty, and disgusted by 
the prospect of someone saying their religious belief is untrue, followed by political, followed by 
factual beliefs. Furthermore, disagreements over factual statements will have almost no 
emotional effects whereas those over religious and political disagreements will. Participants will 
feel more surprised and confused when someone says a fact is definitely untrue, compared to 
when someone says a political or religious statement is untrue.  
 Hypothesis 7G: Participants will respond that arguments against their religious beliefs are 
most predictable and say they make the most logical sense, followed by arguments against 
political and then factual beliefs. Participants will rate arguments against their factual beliefs 
lower on value and interestingness compared to political and religious counterarguments. 
Participants will say they would avoid religious and political counterarguments more than they 
would avoid factual counterarguments.  
8.2 Method 
8.2.1 Participants 
 160 American participants (101 male) over the age of 18 (mean age 41.34), recruited 
from MTurk, participated in the study. 
8.2.2 Procedure and Measures 
 As with the previous studies, participants completed Part 1 and then were presented with 
statements that they had rated as at least 85 on the scale of certainly true. In Part 2, along with 
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each statement, participants were presented with the following questions in random order. 
Participants responded to all questions using a slider depicting words but not numbers, except 
question 4 which required them to choose between ‘believe’ and ‘know’.  
 Question 1: “Sometimes it is very obvious that a statement is true. For example, it is very 
obvious that 1+1 = 2. Other times, a statement is true but it is not so obvious. For example, solid 
objects are composed of invisible atoms, but it is not so obvious that that is true. Please rate how 
obvious it is that the statement above is true. (Please note, we are not asking how true the 
statement is, but rather, how obvious it is that the statement is true.)  
 Question 2: Once we determine some statements are true, we never again consider the 
possibility that they might be false. For example, at some point in your life you learned that our 
planet is called “Earth” and you probably never wondered whether this was false – you simply 
accepted it and never thought about it again. However, for some statements, we determine they 
are true but sometimes wonder if they might be false (even though we still think they are true). 
For example, you probably learned that many, many years ago, before the beginning of time, 
there were no planets, light, or any physical matter at all. Even though you believe this is true, 
you might wonder sometimes if it is false. Think about the statement above. How frequently 
have you wondered about the possibility that it might be false (even though you still think it is 
true)?  
 Question 3: Imagine another person. This person is a reasonable person who has the same 
education level that you have. How certain are you that this person would think that the 
statement above is true? (Please note, we are not asking how certain you are that the statement is 
true, but rather, how certain you are that the other person would think the statement is true.) 
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 Question 4: Some statements we believe are true while other statements we know are 
true. Please select the option that most accurately describes how you feel about this statement: 
a. I believe this statement is true  
b. I know this statement is true 
 Question 5: For some statements, it requires effort, commitment, or dedication to believe 
they are true. However, for other statements, it is automatic and effortless to believe they are 
true. Think about the statement above. How much effort, dedication, or commitment does it 
require to believe the statement above is true? 
 In Part 1, you indicated that you are highly certain that the statement above is true. Now 
please imagine a person who disagrees with you. This person has thought about the statement 
above and decided that it is definitely false. Please answer each of the following questions: 
 Question 6: If you listened to this person talk about why they think this statement is false, 
how do you think that would make you feel? [Here participants saw separate sliders, one for each 
of the following:  angry, sad, mad, happy, disgusted, scared, surprised, confused, offended, 
guilty]. 
 Question 7: Imagine this person’s arguments about why you are wrong. Use the sliders 
below to indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements:”  [Here 
participants saw separate sliders, one for each of the following: these arguments would be 
valuable for me to hear; these arguments would be predictable; these arguments would be 
interesting; these arguments would make logical sense; I would avoid hearing these arguments]. 
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8.3 Results 
 In Part 1 of the study, some participants did not indicate that they were highly certain that 
any statement was true for at least one domain. It was preferable to have at least one data point 
for each participant for each domain, so these participants were excluded from the analyses 
leaving a remaining 114 participants (69 males).  
 Participants could see the same question up to two times per domain (for up to two 
statements per domain). For all the questions with sliders, the mean response was calculated for 
each question, for each participant, in each domain. To compare across domains, these mean 
response values were entered into repeated measures ANOVAs. The independent variable for 
each ANOVA was the domain, and the dependent variable was the mean slider response. In 
some cases, the difference between political/religious statements was not in the predicted 
direction, and/or not significant, but the predicted direction of the factual domain was observed 
in nearly all cases (see Table 8).  
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Table 8. Questions, mean slider responses, and p values from ANOVA tests – Study 7 
     p values from comparisons 
Question Political 
Mean 
 (SE) 
Religious 
Mean  
(SE) 
Factual 
Mean 
(SE) 
F 
 
Political 
vs. 
Religious 
Political 
vs.  
Factual 
Religious 
vs. 
Factual 
Is the truth obvious?  58.67 
(2.36) 
59.73 
(3.06) 
86.16 
(1.94) 
66.73 
 
1 *** *** 
Would another reasonable person believe 
this? 
59.57 
(2.27) 
53.70 
(2.53) 
86.78 
(2.12) 
53.35 
 
0.118 *** *** 
How much effort to believe?  35.72 
(2.60) 
35.50 
(3.04) 
12.16 
(2.15) 
83.77 1 *** *** 
How frequently do you doubt? 29.76 
(2.24) 
25.57 
(2.50) 
7.14 
(1.69) 
53.36 0.411 *** *** 
Listening to a non-believer - Angry? 30.99 
(2.90) 
17.88 
(2.57) 
15.63 
(2.34) 
17.33 *** *** 1 
Listening to a non-believer - Sad? 24.23 
(2.52) 
30.05 
(3.05) 
21.03 
(2.80) 
3.08 0.222 0.94 * 
Listening to a non-believer - Mad? 30.81 
(2.94) 
16.19 
(2.31) 
14.16 
(2.20) 
18.13 *** *** 1 
Listening to a non-believer - Happy 4.46 
(1.24) 
7.82 
(1.92) 
6.12 
(1.46) 
1.44 0.284 0.76 0.914 
Listening to a non-believer - Disgusted? 31.29 
(3.03) 
14.82 
(2.34) 
20.12 
(2.75) 
17.80 *** ** 0.156 
Listening to a non-believer - Scared? 14.50 
(2.21) 
11.21 
(2.10) 
11.11 
(1.94) 
1.81 0.337 0.315 1 
Listening to a non-believer - Surprised? 31.59 
(2.78) 
26.09 
(2.81) 
63.36 
(3.42) 
53.24 0.106 *** *** 
Listening to a non-believer - Confused? 21.61 
(2.57) 
18.99 
(2.53) 
43.48 
(3.42) 
26.44 0.585 *** *** 
Listening to a non-believer - Offended? 23.45 
(2.77) 
14.84 
(2.28) 
8.89 
(2.01) 
12 ** *** 0.058 
Listening to a non-believer - Guilty? 3.18 
(.87) 
3.24 
(.97) 
2.43 
(.89) 
2.32 1 0.884 0.139 
Counterarguments would be Valuable 51.11 
(2.90) 
37.15 
(3.10) 
22.30 
(2.37) 
48.12 *** *** *** 
Counterarguments would be Predictable 61.79 
(2.59) 
68.13 
(2.72) 
24.92 
(2.50) 
76.81 0.162 *** *** 
Counterarguments would be Logical 35.56 
(2.25) 
26.50 
(2.37) 
16.79 
(2.04) 
25.68 ** *** ** 
I would avoid counterarguments  37.83 
(2.90) 
47.68 
(3.06) 
43.07 
(3.30) 
4.65 ** 0.372 0.52 
Counterarguments would be Interesting 47.65 
(2.83) 
36.28 
(2.96) 
49.18 
(3.18) 
7.22 ** 1 ** 
Note. The question column displays a summary of the question or prompt that the participants saw. The 
political mean, religious mean, and factual mean columns show the means of the mean slider responses to 
each question for each domain. df for all ANOVAS were (2, 112). * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001. 
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 For the “believe vs. know” question, participants responded more frequently that they 
‘know’ factual statements whereas they ‘believe’ political and religious statements (see Fig. 6). 
Religious statements included eight “pro-religious” statements and two “anti-religious” 
statements. In Figure 6 (but not in the accompanying chi square analyses), the pro-religious 
statements are presented separately, showing even more of an effect of domain. A chi-square test 
of independence revealed a significant difference between domains (chi square = 69.12, df = 2, p 
< .0001). Pairwise comparisons were as follows: Political vs. religious chi square = 2.19, df = 1, 
p = .12; political vs. factual chi square = 61.84, df = 1, p < .0001; factual vs. religious chi square 
= 44.47, df = 1, p < .0001). 
 
Figure 6: Frequencies of “believe” vs. “know” responses 
8.4 Study 7 Discussion 
 Hypotheses 7A-7E were supported. Specifically, participants responded that factual truth 
is more obvious than political/religious truth; that factual truth is more reasonable than 
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political/religious truth (by saying that a reasonable person would be more likely to believe 
factual statements); that religious/political truth requires more effort, commitment, and 
dedication to believe than factual truth; that they doubt political/religious truth more often than 
they doubt factual truth; and that they mostly “believe” religious/political statements whereas 
they mostly “know” factual statements.  
 Hypothesis 7F was partially supported. Participants typically responded that they would 
experience more negative emotions (such as anger, sadness, offense, and disgust) in the face of 
political/religious counterarguments. This finding suggests that participants don’t necessarily 
find counterarguments to be false, but rather find them to be upsetting because of their political 
or religious implications. In addition, participants said they would be more surprised and 
confused by factual counterarguments. This finding suggests that participants find factual 
counterarguments to be more certainly false and inconsistent with reality. It can be inferred from 
this finding that participants think of factual truth as more certainly true and consistent with 
reality compared to religious and political truth.  
 However, no significant difference was observed in reported levels of guilt across 
domains when imagining listening to counterarguments. The hypothesis that participants would 
feel more guilty if listening to counterarguments in the political and religious domains was based 
on the idea that political and religious beliefs signal coalition affiliation. Entertaining 
counterarguments in these domains might, therefore, feel like a form of betrayal against one’s 
group and cause one to feel guilty. It is possible that participants didn’t interpret the question as 
asking about engaging with or considering the validity of counterarguments, which might lead to 
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guilt but rather, participants interpreted the question as asking about simply hearing someone 
else say a counterargument.  
 Hypothesis 7G was partially supported. Participants responded that political/religious 
counterarguments are more valuable, predictable, and logical than factual counterarguments. 
This finding suggests that people are aware of convincing, strong arguments against their 
political/religious beliefs but not against their factual beliefs. Some of the observed results were 
not predicted. Participants responded that religious counterarguments would be less interesting 
than political or factual counterarguments, and that they would avoid factual and religious 
counterarguments more than political.   
 Taken together, the findings from Study 7 strongly support the argument that people 
think of religious and political truth differently than they think of factual truth. Religious and 
political truth is less obvious, less reasonable, more effortful to believe, more dubious, and less 
“known.” Hearing counterarguments against religious/political knowledge is more likely to 
cause negative emotions like anger and disgust – a reaction that does not clearly follow if one 
believes the counterarguments are clearly false. Conversely, counterarguments against factual 
knowledge cause surprise and confusion, which makes sense if one believes that the 
counterarguments are clearly false. Furthermore, counterarguments against religious/political 
knowledge are reported to be more valuable, predictable, and logical.  
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Chapter 9: General Discussion 
 The current research examined folk epistemology in laypeople, that is, laypeople’s 
intuitions and thoughts about their own knowledge. Several principles from academic 
epistemology (e.g., verification, falsification, theories of truth, testimony) were examined along 
with other concepts surrounding intuitions about knowledge (e.g., certainty, doubt, objectivity, 
tolerance of disagreement). In conjunction with this exploration, three domains of knowledge, 
political, religious, and factual, were evaluated for hypothesized folk epistemological 
differences. This research illuminated intuitive epistemology, showing for the first time how 
laypeople think about a variety of epistemological concepts in relation to their own beliefs. In 
addition, several hypotheses were supported, demonstrating the unique intuitive epistemological 
standards underpinning religious and political belief. Taken together, these findings show that 
laypeople think of religious and political truth in a different sense than factual truth. Laypeople 
rely less on normative epistemological principles when explaining how and why their political 
and religious beliefs are true. If “truth” is taken to mean purely tracking reality, then these 
findings suggest that people are less certain about political and religious truth compared to 
factual.  
9.1 Summary of Purpose and Goals 
 The overall purpose of the research was to describe how laypeople intuitively think about 
various epistemological concepts in relation to their own beliefs. Another goal was to investigate 
whether, as hypothesized, laypeople depart from normative epistemology when thinking about 
why their religious and political beliefs are true. 
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 Religious and political knowledge were of interest because (i) folk epistemology in these 
domains has been underexplored (ii) beliefs in these domains, unlike in other domains, have 
major social consequences, resulting in a unique motivational landscape related to belief, and 
(iii) content in these domains often involves clear departures from academic, normative 
epistemology and is identified as obviously false by non-believers.  
 Factual knowledge was of interest because it offered a window into “default” folk 
epistemology. That is, intuitions about factual knowledge represent how laypeople think about 
straightforward, everyday truth, and thereby offer a comparison against which to understand 
individuals’ religious and political folk epistemology. 
9.2 Summary of Findings  
 Study 1 showed that people can reliably categorize propositions as belonging to religious, 
political, and factual categories. Participants’ ability to categorize statements consistently into 
the intended domains provided the basis for determining which statements best represented the 
target domains to most people. Study 2 validated the statements that were to be used in studies 3-
7 and also showed that people find religious and political uncertainty more difficult to resolve 
than factual uncertainty. This difference in resolvability of uncertainty was evidence supporting 
the argument that political and religious truth is of a different nature than factual truth.  
 Studies 3-7 examined various epistemological concepts in laypeople, testing the 
differences among religious, political, and factual beliefs in each study. Study 3 tested 
verification and found a huge difference in how people think about the verifiability of religious, 
political, and factual statements. Nearly everyone said they could verify their factual beliefs 
whereas less than half reported their religious beliefs to be verifiable. Participants located the 
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verifiability of political beliefs between the other two domains. On average, participants 
responded that the best way to establish truth involves verification, and the best proof of truth is 
evidence in the world. However, religiosity correlated negatively with both valuing verification 
and observable evidence as means of establishing truth. Religiosity and political orientation did 
not correlate with whether one thought statements were verifiable.  
 Study 4 tested falsification. Less than a third of participants responded that their religious 
beliefs were falsifiable whereas most responded that factual and political beliefs were. On 
average, participants were moderately in agreement that falsification is required in order to 
determine truth. Religiosity and political orientation didn’t correlate with whether one thought 
statements were falsifiable. 
 Study 5 investigated theories of truth derived from academic epistemology along with 
other reasons for one’s belief. On average, participants reported that the coherence theory of 
truth was less of a basis for their religious and political beliefs compared to factual. The reverse 
pattern was found for the pragmatic theory of truth. Trust in the testimony of others and 
indoctrination were found to be more important for acquiring religious and political knowledge 
compared to factual. Coherence theory was favored more than any of the other theories of truth 
across all three domains of knowledge. Participants seemed to struggle with the meaning of 
correspondence theory, rating it the most related to political beliefs but less involved in 
determining religious or factual truth.  
 In Study 6, participants reported that factual truth was the most objective, political truth 
the most subjective, and religious truth the most nihilistic (i.e., it was impossible to say whether 
religious truth was subjective or objective). People reported feeling negative emotions when 
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reflecting on religious and political counterarguments whereas they reported feelings of surprise 
and confusion in the face of factual counterarguments.  
 Study 7 examined a variety of concepts surrounding intuitions about knowledge. On 
average, participants responded that factual truth is more obvious, more reasonable, more 
effortless to believe, less dubious, and more “known” than religious and political truth.  
9.3 Implications 
 At the most basic level, these findings reveal much about folk epistemology that was 
previously unknown. Principles from academic epistemology were investigated for the first time 
in laypeople along with a variety of intuitive concepts (like frequency of doubt, reasonableness 
of truth, and judgements of counterarguments). Overall, the approach taken here illuminated 
many features of belief that have been unstudied.   
 The deeper connection to previous research however, lies in the folk epistemological 
domain differences identified.  Throughout the history of the study of folk epistemology, 
questions about domain generality versus specificity have persisted. Some scholars have found 
evidence for domain-general trends (Schommer & Walker, 1995; Schommer-Aikins et al., 2003), 
but many others have increasingly demonstrated domain specificity in folk epistemology (Muis 
et al., 2006). That is, intuitive perspectives about knowledge along a variety of dimensions have 
been found to differ according to the type of knowledge.  
The current research is the first systematic investigation of the folk epistemology of 
ideological beliefs (religious and political). These domains have largely been ignored by those 
studying folk epistemology despite their compelling and extreme domain differences. Much of 
the previous work on domain specificity of folk epistemology has been motivated by an interest 
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in learning, education, and development. Thus, “domain” has often been taken to mean academic 
discipline, like psychology, hard sciences, or history (Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000).  
 Amidst the debate about domain differences, the framework depicted in Table 1 (Kuhn et 
al., 2000) emerged as a relatively popular unification of theories and findings. On the domain-
general side, a reliable shift from absolutist through multiplist, and then finally to evaluativist 
seems to occur across at least several domains studied. On the domain-specific side, however, 
the rate at which this developmental trajectory occurs, varies according to the specific domain of 
knowledge.  
 But does this framework suffice for the religious and political domains? Although the 
present research did not investigate developmental stages, the current findings suggest that lay 
perspectives about religious and political beliefs do not fit into the Kuhn et al. (2000) framework. 
According to Kuhn et al., adults reach the evaluativist stage, characterized by an appreciation for 
well-reasoned arguments and evidence. Critical thinking is valued as a means for achieving 
understanding.  
 Adults’ responses to the epistemological questions with respect to factual statements, 
indeed, were consistent with the evaluativist perspective. On average, participants indicated that 
they relied on verification, observable evidence in the world, and logical coherence for factual 
statements. If the evaluativist stage were truly domain general, that is, if the characteristic 
perspectives towards knowledge occurred for all types of knowledge, then participants would 
have responded to the religious and political statements similarly to how they responded to 
factual statements. Responses regarding religious and political knowledge, however, bore no 
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resemblance to evaluativism. Religious and political beliefs were said to be true with less or little 
reliance on reason or evidence.  
 In order to compare the evaluativist perspective to the intuitions underlying religious and 
political beliefs, consider the religious proposition, “Jesus walked on water without sinking.” For 
someone who rated the proposition as ‘very certainly true,’ the findings of the current research 
show that this person could simultaneously value verification and falsification yet find this 
proposition to be unverifiable and unfalsifiable. She could sometimes doubt whether this 
proposition were true. She would describe her commitment to the truth of this proposition as 
“believing” as opposed to “knowing.” She could say it requires effort to believe this statement, 
that its truth is not obvious, and that it is unreasonable to believe. She would think belief in this 
statement would be unlikely if she had learned about it after age of 25. If someone else argued 
against believing this proposition were true, then she would feel upset emotionally but not 
confused or surprised. In fact, she would find the counterarguments valuable, predictable, and 
logical. Finally, she would find it impossible to say who was right or wrong about the 
disagreement.  
 Such a pattern of folk epistemology cannot be described as “evaluativist” and isn’t 
accurately described by other previous theories. Moreover, the “multiplist” or “absolutist” labels 
do not fit well either. Participants didn’t think of their religious and political beliefs as 
objectively true nor exactly as opinions. The findings, taken together, paint a picture of religious 
and political folk epistemology that challenges previously accepted definitions of truth, 
knowledge, or belief. These results suggest that commitment to the truth value of a proposition in 
the religious and political domains does not depend on academic/normative epistemology nor on 
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standard folk epistemology. It may not even depend exclusively on the content of the 
proposition.  
 The findings of the current research suggest that people are less certain that political and 
religious statements are “true” in the sense that they represent or describe reality. If this is the 
case, then political and religious beliefs are the most striking cases of domain specificity in folk 
epistemology ever studied.   
9.4 Caveats and Directions for Future Research 
 Participants appeared to interpret some questions, or components of questions, in 
unintended ways. As a consequence, a few of the results are unclear or show no difference 
between domains. Taken as a whole, however, the body of findings represents a consistent 
convergence. Nonetheless, these presumably misinterpreted questions could be improved. For 
instance, participants’ understanding of falsification and correspondence theory could have been 
better established as part of investigating laypeople’s intuitions regarding these concepts.  
 Participants identified political beliefs as falsifiable more frequently than they did factual 
beliefs. It is impossible to know exactly why this result was found but the explanation that 
participants could not imagine falsifying factual statements like “Maine is north of Florida,” 
seems likely. Similarly, participants responded that correspondence theory was more the basis 
for political truth than it was for factual truth. The possible explanation raised for this result was 
that participants focused on the terminology in the question which asked about “events in the 
world,” and may have sounded too political.  
 If these interpretations are correct, then they would constitute a misunderstanding of 
falsification and correspondence theory by participants. But it is worth noting that even if these 
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concepts were misunderstood, something can be learned from the results. If applying falsification 
to everyday factual knowledge sounds simply impossible, and if the idea of statements 
corresponding to states of the world is confusing to laypeople, then it could be the case that these 
principles are not major components of folk epistemology. This conclusion cannot be made from 
the current results, but the possibility that laypeople rarely, if ever, think about falsification or 
correspondence could be better investigated in future research.   
 It is possible that asking laypeople to imagine listening to counterarguments against their 
religious and political beliefs failed to evoke the intended emotional response. For some of the 
questions regarding reactions to counterarguments, the predictions were unconfirmed. In future 
research, an alternative manipulation that evoked more emotion could be explored to better test 
the hypotheses about reactions to challenges to one’s beliefs in different domains.  
 The current research reveals a lot about what political and religious beliefs are not – they 
are not considered to be certainly true factual knowledge that describes reality. But this then 
raises the question as to what they are. What is their function? How are they acquired and 
maintained? Given that they don’t exclusively track reality, to what extent does the content of 
religious and political propositions motivate behavior (e.g., if one “believes” that he will go to 
heaven then is he willing to take suicidal risks)? It remains to be determined whether the 
characteristics of the evaluativist stage are absent in the religious and political domains or if they 
are present but fail to determine beliefs due to other influences. In other words, do believers have 
access to a critical analysis of their religious and political beliefs, including potentially damning 
counterarguments, but nevertheless maintain these beliefs because of other motivations?  These 
are questions that now remain for future research. A fuller understanding of religious and 
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political beliefs may contribute to advances in conflict resolution and to more successful 
approaches to persuasion. Finally, this understanding can serve as a window into our social 
nature, illuminating the bonding and group affiliation signaling that these beliefs are likely to 
facilitate.  
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Appendix 1: List of Statements Used in Study 1 
Statement 
Number 
Intended 
Domain 
Statement Categorized 
as Intended 
by 
Opposite Statement Categorized 
as Intended 
by 
1 Political A powerful military is 
necessary to protect 
American interests 
88% A powerful military is 
not necessary to protect 
American interests 
87% 
2 Political Affirmative action leads to 
unqualified individuals 
holding important jobs 
81% Affirmative action does 
not lead to unqualified 
individuals holding 
important jobs 
69% 
3 Political All Israel wants is to live in 
peace and Palestine is 
preventing that from 
happening. 
80% All Palestine wants is to 
live in peace and Israel is 
preventing that from 
happening. 
77% 
4 Political Allowing airport security to 
profile passengers 
maximizes safety. 
55% Allowing airport security 
to profile passengers 
does not maximize 
safety.  
51% 
5 Political Allowing the NSA to 
monitor cell phone 
conversations helps fight 
terrorism 
72% Allowing the NSA to 
monitor cell phone 
conversations does not 
help fight terrorism 
81% 
6 Political Global warming is caused 
by human pollution 
36% Global warming is not 
caused by human 
pollution 
39% 
7 Political Green energy (like wind 
and solar power) is a 
realistic alternative 
35% Green energy (like wind 
and solar power) is not a 
realistic alternative. 
41% 
8 Political Heavily taxing large 
corporations causes the 
overall economy to suffer 
88% Heavily taxing large 
corporations does not 
cause the overall 
economy to suffer 
82% 
9 Political Labor unions are essential 
for protecting workers' 
rights 
70% Labor unions are not 
essential for protecting 
workers' rights 
75% 
10 Political Legalizing marijuana is 
overall more costly to 
society  
78% Legalizing marijuana is 
overall less costly to 
society  
70% 
11 Political Maintaining a high prison 
population is an effective 
way of deterring crime 
69% Maintaining a high 
prison population is not 
an effective way of 
deterring crime. 
56% 
12 Political Minimum wage is enough 
to support an individual 
63% Minimum wage is too 
low to support an 
individual 
49% 
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13 Political Most people on welfare are 
abusing the system rather 
than looking for work 
70% Most people on welfare 
are looking for work 
rather than abusing the 
system 
61% 
14 Political Offering a path to 
citizenship to illegal 
immigrants will cause more 
people to illegally enter the 
USA 
89% Offering a path to 
citizenship to illegal 
immigrants will not 
cause more people to 
illegally enter the USA 
85% 
15 Political Police in the USA often use 
lethal force against unarmed 
black males because of 
racism 
59% Police in the USA rarely 
use lethal force against 
unarmed black males 
because of racism 
67% 
16 Political Providing condoms in 
public schools is an 
effective way to reduce 
STDs and pregnancy 
28% Providing condoms in 
public schools is not an 
effective way to reduce 
STDs and pregnancy 
47% 
17 Political Public funding for stem cell 
research will lead to 
extremely valuable medical 
knowledge 
52% Public funding for stem 
cell research will not 
lead to extremely 
valuable medical 
knowledge 
53% 
18 Political Regulations on businesses 
are necessary to prevent 
mass extinction of species 
in the wild 
55% Regulations on 
businesses are not 
necessary to prevent 
mass extinction of 
species in the wild 
70% 
19 Political School vouchers incentivize 
poorly performing public 
schools to improve 
71% School vouchers do not 
incentivize poorly 
performing public 
schools to improve 
63% 
20 Political Securing the Mexican 
border  will strengthen the 
American job market 
85% Securing the Mexican 
border will not 
strengthen the American 
job market 
86% 
21 Political Spending more tax dollars 
on the worst performing 
public schools is a waste 
84% Spending more tax 
dollars on the worst 
performing public 
schools is not a waste 
83% 
22 Political The death penalty deters 
crime 
70% The death penalty does 
not deter crime 
66% 
23 Political The military is weaker if it 
allows open homosexuality. 
75% The military is not 
weaker if it allows open 
homosexuality 
72% 
24 Political The population of a country, 
on average, receives inferior 
healthcare when the 
86% The population of a 
country, on average, 
receives superior 
healthcare when the 
73% 
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healthcare system is run by 
the government.  
healthcare system is run 
by the government.  
25 Political The right to own guns 
makes society less safe 
69% The right to own guns 
makes society safer 
81% 
26 Political The war on drugs is a 
failure 
61% The war on drugs is not 
a failure 
82% 
27 Political Torturing suspected 
terrorists helps keep the 
country safe 
82% Torturing suspected 
terrorists does not help 
keep the country safe 
68% 
28 Political Universities nationwide 
have a lax response to 
sexual assault on their 
campuses.  
33% Universities nationwide 
do not have a lax 
response to sexual 
assault on their 
campuses.  
45% 
29 Political War against Iran is probably 
necessary to protect national 
security 
90% War against Iran is 
probably unnecessary to 
protect national security 
92% 
30 Political Women are paid less than 
men due to sexism 
49% Women are not paid less 
than men due to sexism 
52% 
31 Factual A square has four right 
angles 
98% A square does not have 
four right angles 
63% 
32 Factual Airplanes are safe to 
operate underwater  
57% Airplanes are unsafe to 
operate underwater  
91% 
33 Factual Alcohol consumption 
impairs driving ability in 
most people 
92% Alcohol consumption 
improves driving ability 
in most people. 
64% 
34 Factual Barak Obama's birthday is 
August 2nd 
78% Barak Obama's birthday 
is not August 2nd 
74% 
35 Factual Birds can fly 100% Birds can't fly 56% 
36 Factual Bucharest is the capital of 
Romania 
94% Bucharest is not the 
capital of Romania 
79% 
37 Factual Cellular phones cause HIV 49% Cellular phones do not 
cause HIV 
90% 
38 Factual Coca-Cola is a brand of 
soda 
98% Coca-Cola is not a brand 
of soda 
64% 
39 Factual Corn grows well on the 
moon 
56% Corn does not grow well 
on the moon 
89% 
40 Factual Dinosaurs live today in the 
Florida swamps 
54% Dinosaurs do not live 
today in the Florida 
swamps 
93% 
41 Factual Earth's atmosphere is 
mostly oxygen 
85% Earth's atmosphere is not 
mostly oxygen 
91% 
42 Factual George Clooney is a man 96% George Clooney is a 
woman 
53% 
43 Factual germs are very small 95% germs are very large 59% 
44 Factual Gold is heavier than silver 77% Gold is lighter than 
silver 
72% 
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45 Factual Limes are an excellent 
source of vitamin C 
87% Limes are a poor source 
of vitamin C 
76% 
46 Factual Maine is north of Florida 92% Maine is south of Florida 67% 
47 Factual Most crimes are committed 
by people over 80 years old 
43% Most crimes are 
committed by people 
under 80 years old 
73% 
48 Factual Nigeria has a smaller 
population than Japan 
82% Nigeria has a larger 
population than Japan 
87% 
49 Factual On average, the north pole 
is colder than the equator 
94% On average, the north 
pole is warmer than the 
equator 
67% 
50 Factual Regular exercise usually 
helps people lose weight 
90% Regular exercise rarely 
helps people lose weight 
67% 
51 Factual Tables are often made of 
wood.  
90% Tables are rarely made 
of wood.  
58% 
52 Factual The 10 tallest buildings in 
the world are made entirely 
of tissue paper 
56% The 10 tallest buildings 
in the world are not 
made entirely of tissue 
paper 
88% 
53 Factual The first postage stamp was 
issued in 1748 
85% The first postage stamp 
was not issued in 1748 
76% 
54 Factual The invention of the 
internet made sending and 
receiving information easier 
88% The invention of the 
internet made sending 
and receiving 
information more 
difficult 
55% 
55 Factual The strength of gravity 
changes according to which 
day of the week it is 
74% The strength of gravity 
does not change 
according to which day 
of the week it is 
91% 
56 Factual Tom Cruise exists 93% Tom Cruise does not 
exist 
54% 
57 Factual Trees have brains 62% Trees do not have brains 85% 
58 Factual Tylenol relieves fever and 
headache 
98% Tylenol does not relieve 
fever and headache 
66% 
59 Factual Ultraviolet light is visible to 
humans  
69% Ultraviolet light is not 
visible to humans  
91% 
60 Factual US dollars are the official 
currency of every country in 
the world 
49% US dollars are not the 
official currency of 
every country in the 
world 
68% 
61 Religious After death, there is 
nothing. You simply die and 
that's it 
71% After death, there is 
something. You don't 
simply die and that's it  
84% 
62 Religious After people die their soul 
goes to heaven or hell 
95% After people die nothing 
else happens.  
76% 
63 Religious Angels exist 91% Angels do not exist 81% 
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64 Religious Angels visit people in 
dreams 
89% Angels do not visit 
people in dreams 
78% 
65 Religious God can be in multiple 
locations at the same time.  
96% God cannot be in 
multiple locations at the 
same time.  
86% 
66 Religious God can hear people's 
thoughts 
96% God cannot hear people's 
thoughts 
90% 
67 Religious God exists 93% God did not write the 10 
commandments on 
stones for Moses 
89% 
68 Religious God wrote the 10 
commandments on stones 
for Moses 
93% God does not exist 81% 
69 Religious Jesus' mother, Mary, was a 
virgin when she gave birth 
to Jesus 
96% Jesus did not rise from 
the dead 
86% 
70 Religious Jesus rose from the dead 99% Jesus did not walk on 
water without sinking 
90% 
71 Religious Jesus walked on water 
without sinking 
94% Jesus' mother, Mary, was 
not a virgin when she 
gave birth to Jesus 
86% 
72 Religious Jesus was more just a 
person and had supernatural 
powers 
93% Jesus was just a person 
with no supernatural 
powers 
84% 
73 Religious Noah put all animal species 
onto an ark to save them 
from a flood 
89% Noah did not put all 
animal species onto an 
ark to save them from a 
flood 
84% 
74 Religious Prayer can alter what 
happens in the future 
96% Prayer has no effect on 
the future 
89% 
75 Religious Satan can cause evil events 
to occur by using 
supernatural powers 
92% Satan cannot cause evil 
events to occur by using 
supernatural powers 
91% 
76 Religious Satan is real 95% Satan was made up to 
scare people 
77% 
77 Religious Sometimes miracles cause 
people to recover from 
illness 
86% Miracles never cause 
people to recover from 
illness 
76% 
78 Religious The bible is perfect and 
doesn't have contradictions 
and errors 
88% The bible is far from 
perfect and full of 
contradictions and errors 
85% 
79 Religious The first humans were 
created in the garden of 
Eden 
91% The first humans were 
not created in the garden 
of Eden 
67% 
80 Religious There is a preexisting plan 
for each individual's life.  
88% There is no preexisting 
plan for each individual's 
life 
71% 
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81 Religious There will be a second 
coming of Jesus Christ.  
97% There will never be a 
second coming of Jesus 
Christ.  
86% 
82 Religious When people consume 
bread and wine at 
communion, it turns into 
flesh and blood inside them 
77% When people consume 
bread and wine at 
communion, it does not 
turn into flesh and blood 
inside them 
64% 
83 Other Frank Sinatra is better than 
Lady Gaga 
66% No opposite presented 
84 Other Secrets are more morally 
correct than lies 
58% No opposite presented 
85 Other The ethical thing to do is 
make ceilings lower 
64% No opposite presented 
86 Other Shorts look better than 
pants. 
71% No opposite presented 
87 Other The sewing machine is a 
more impressive invention 
than the printing press 
63% No opposite presented 
88 Other Einstein was smarter than 
Isaac Newton 
55% No opposite presented 
89 Other 72 is a more comfortable 
temperature than 71 
60% No opposite presented 
90 Other Losing one big toe would be 
worse than losing both 
middle fingers 
63% No opposite presented 
91 Other It's ok to be a hypocrite 65% No opposite presented 
92 Other A hot dog is not a sandwich 31% No opposite presented 
93 Other Chocolate is better than 
vanilla 
70% No opposite presented 
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Appendix 2: List of statements used in Study 2. 
Domain Statement 
PS1 War against Iran is probably unnecessary to protect national security. (R) 
PS2 Offering a path to citizenship to illegal immigrants will cause more people to illegally 
enter the USA. 
PS3 A powerful military is necessary to protect American interests. 
PS4 Securing the Mexican border will not strengthen the American job market. (R) 
PS5 The population of a country, on average, receives inferior healthcare when the 
healthcare system is run by the government. 
PS6 Spending more tax dollars on the worst performing public schools is a waste. 
PS7 The war on drugs is not a failure. 
PS8 Torturing suspected terrorists helps keep the country safe. 
PS9 The right to own guns makes society safer. 
PS10 Affirmative action leads to unqualified individuals holding important jobs. 
RS1 Jesus' mother, Mary, was a virgin when she gave birth to Jesus. 
RS2 Prayer can alter what happens in the future. 
RS3 After people die their soul goes to heaven or hell. 
RS4 Satan is real. 
RS5 Jesus walked on water without sinking. 
RS6 God exists. 
RS7 The first humans were created in the Garden of Eden. 
RS8 Noah put all animal species onto an ark to save them from a flood. 
RS9 Jesus did not rise from the dead. (R) 
FS1 Tom Cruise exists. 
FS2 Dinosaurs do not live today in the Florida swamps. 
FS3 Bucharest is the capital of Romania. 
FS4 Earth's atmosphere is not mostly oxygen. 
FS5 Ultraviolet light is not visible to humans. 
FS6 Nigeria has a larger population than Japan. 
FS7 The first postage stamp was issued in 1748. 
FS8 Barak Obama's birthday is August 2nd. 
FS9 Gold is heavier than silver. 
FS10 Cellular phones do not cause HIV. 
Note. P, R, and F represent Political, Religious, and Factual. There was an error with the 10th religious 
statement so it is not shown in Appendix 2, and questions about that statement were excluded 
from the analyses. 
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Appendix 3: List of Statements Used in Studies 3-7 
Domain Statement 
Political The military is weaker if it allows open homosexuality. 
Political Most people on welfare are abusing the system rather than looking for work. 
Political A powerful military is necessary to protect American interests. 
Political Affirmative action leads to unqualified individuals holding important jobs. 
Political The population of a country, on average, receives inferior healthcare when the healthcare 
system is run by the government. 
Political Labor unions are essential for protecting workers' rights. 
Political Securing the Mexican border will strengthen the American job market. 
Political All Palestine wants is to live in peace and Israel is preventing that from happening 
Political Torturing suspected terrorists does not help keep the country safe. 
Political The right to own guns makes society safer. 
Religious When people consume bread and wine at communion, it turns into flesh and blood inside 
them. 
Religious Jesus' mother, Mary, was a virgin when she gave birth to Jesus. 
Religious The first humans were created in the Garden of Eden. 
Religious The Bible is far from perfect and full of contradictions and errors. 
Religious After someone dies their soul goes to heaven or hell. 
Religious Satan is real. 
Religious Jesus walked on water without sinking. 
Religious God exists. 
Religious Noah put all animal species onto an ark to save them from a flood. 
Religious Jesus did not rise from the dead. 
Factual Cellular phones do not cause HIV. 
Factual Tom Cruise exists. 
Factual Coca-Cola is a brand of soda. 
Factual Maine is north of Florida. 
Factual Airplanes are unsafe to operate underwater. 
Factual Ultraviolet light is visible to humans. 
Factual Germs are very small. 
Factual Limes are a poor source of vitamin C. 
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Factual Barack Obama's birthday is August 2nd. 
Factual Gold is heavier than silver. 
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Appendix 4: New Indices of Religious Orientation (NIRO) 
 Participants respond on a Likert scale from 0-4 (agree strongly, agree, not certain, 
disagree, and disagree strongly) for each of the 27 items. There are no reverse-scored items. The 
scale provides three scores: extrinsic orientation, intrinsic orientation, and quest, which are each 
the sum of the 9 responses in their respective sections.  
New Indices of Religious Orientation (NIRO) 
 Extrinsic orientation  
Compartmentalization 
1) While I believe in my religion, there are more important things in my life. 
2) While I am a religious person, I do not let religion influence my daily life. 
3) Occasionally, I compromise my religious beliefs to protect my social and economic well-
being. 
Social support 
4)  One reason for me going to church is that it helps to establish me in the community. 
5) A key reason for my interest in church is that it is a pleasant social activity. 
6) I go to church because it helps me to feel at home in my neighborhood. 
Personal support 
7)  One reason for me praying is that it helps me to gain relief and protection. 
8) What prayer offers me most is comfort when sorrow or misfortune strike. 
9)  I pray chiefly because it makes me feel better. 
Intrinsic orientation  
Integration 
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10)  My religious beliefs really shape my whole approach to life. 
11) I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life. 
12) My religious beliefs really shape the way I treat other people. 
13) Public religion I allow almost nothing to prevent me from going to church on Sundays. 
14) I go to church because it helps me to feel close to God. 
15) The church is most important to me as a place to share fellowship with other Christians. 
Personal religion  
16) I pray at home because it helps me to be aware of God’s presence. 
17) I often read books about prayer and the spiritual life. 
18) I pray chiefly because it deepens my relationship with God. 
Quest orientation 
 Existentialism 
19) I was driven to ask religious questions by a growing awareness of the tensions in my world. 
20) My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious beliefs. 
21) Religion only became very important for me when I began to ask questions about the 
meaning of my life. 
Self-criticism  
22) I value my religious doubts and uncertainties. 
23) For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious. 
24) Questions are more important to my religious faith than are answers. 
Openness to change  
25) As I grow and change, I expect my religion to grow and change as well. 
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26) I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs. 
27) There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing. 
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Appendix 5: Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA) 
 Participants respond on 9-point Likert scale from very strongly disagree (-4) to very 
strongly agree (4) for each item. The scale has an equal number of pro- and anti-authoritarian 
statements. The first two items are not included in the overall score and are considered practice. 
Statements 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, and 22 are scored by simply adding 5 to the 
participant’s response. For example, a response of -4 would be scored a 1. The remaining 
statements are reverse-scored (a response of -4 is scored as a 9, for example). The lowest 
possible score is a 20 and the highest is a 180.  
Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA) 
1) The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals 
and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance. 
2) Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married. 
3) Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to 
destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us. 
4) Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else. 
5) It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and 
religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create 
doubt in people’s minds. 
6) Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every 
bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. 
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7) The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional 
values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad 
ideas. 
8) There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. 
9) Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if 
this upsets many people. 
10) Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at 
our moral fiber and traditional beliefs. 
11) Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even 
if it makes them different from everyone else. 
12) The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live. 
13) You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by protesting 
for women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer. 
14) What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take 
us back to our true path. 
15) Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, 
criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed to be done.” 
16) God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it 
is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished. 
17) There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for 
their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action. 
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18) A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are 
submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past. 
19) Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities 
tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything. 
20) There is no “one right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way. 
21) Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy “traditional 
family values.” 
22) This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just shut 
up and accept their group’s traditional place in society. 
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Appendix 6: Demographic Questionnaire 
Please enter your age in years.  
 
Gender: 
 Female 
 Male 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
Which of the following best describes your highest level of education? 
 Less than high school graduate 
 High school graduate 
 Attended some college 
 College graduate 
 Graduate school 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
What was your household income last year before taxes? 
 Less than $25,000 
 $25,000 - 34,999 
 $35,000 - 49,999 
 $50,000 - 74,999 
 $75,000 - 99,999 
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 $100,000 or more 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
Please indicate your ethnicity: 
 Hispanic or Latino 
 Not of Hispanic/Latino Origin 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
Please indicate your race: 
 American Indian/Alaska Native 
 Asian 
 Black/African American 
 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
 White 
 More than one race 
 Other 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
Which of the following best represents your religious affiliation? 
 Roman Catholic 
 Protestant/other non-denominational Christian 
 Jewish 
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 Muslim 
 Mormon 
 Atheist/realist/humanist 
 No affiliation 
 Other 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
What political party do you most identify with? 
 Democrat 
 Republican 
 Independent 
 Constitution Party 
 Green Party of the United States 
 Libertarian Party 
 Other 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
Which description best represents your political ideology? 
 Progressive/very liberal 
 Liberal 
 Moderate 
 Conservative 
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 Very conservative 
 Libertarian 
 Not sure 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
Please indicate the geographic region in which you live: 
 Northeast (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, 
New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey) 
 Midwest (Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Missouri, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa) 
 South (Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Oklahoma, 
Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana) 
 West (Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, Alaska, 
Washington, Oregon, California, Hawaii) 
 Other ____________________ 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
Which of the following best represents where you live? 
 Large city (100,000 or more residents) 
 Small city (less than 100,000 residents) 
 Suburbs 
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 Rural area 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
Please enter your MTurk Worker ID in the text box below. 
 
If you have any general comments about this study enter them here. Let us know if you had any 
difficulty or problems completing the study.  
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